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TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY IN COOK
COUNTY - THE "RAILROAD CASES"
AND THE FUTURE OF DE FACTO
CLASSIFICATION
By RICHARD L.

WATTLING *

Classification of real property for purposes of taxation is a
most important aspect of public finance in Cook County.1 Under
this system of taxation, real estate is grouped into approximately
three dozen classes, which are then taxed, in effect, at varying
rates.2 Such classification substantially affects the incidence of
local taxation. As a practical matter, certain types of residential
real estate, notably single family dwellings, have been greatly favored at the expense of commercial and industrial property.3
Classification of real property for purposes of taxation lacks
both constitutional and statutory sanction; indeed, the Cook
County system may be said to exist despite both the constitution
and the statutes of the State of Illinois. 4 It is the product, in1 For the year 1965, Cook County property tax assessments (equalized)
aggregated $17,747,147,731, distributed as follows: locally assessed real
estate, $14,274,583,469; locally assessed personalty, $3,018,607,803; railroad
property, $124,222,829; and state assessed capital stock, $269,733,830. ILL.
DEPT. OF REVENUE, ANNUAL REPORT 1965, table 2 at 22 (1966).
For
the year 1965, property tax extensions within Cook County aggregated
$915,149,180. THE CIVIC FEDERATION, 34TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF DEBTSTAXES-ASSESSMENTS 19 (1967).
2 See ILL. DEPT. OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS 1965, 132, 134
(1967); see text at notes 127 to 131 infra.
3 Fisher, An Economist's Appraisal of the Illinois Tax System, 1961
U. ILL. L. F. 543, 580:
There is a widespread belief in Illinois that business property in
Chicago is assessed high in relation to individually owned properties
while in downstate areas the reverse is often true. Support for the accuracy of this belief is provided by a recent study made for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. In that study estimates were made of the 1958
taxes which would be paid by two hypothetical firms locating new plants
in various urban and suburban locations in several states. Various
methods were used to estimate the level of assessment in each location.
The resulting estimates indicate that local property taxes in Chicago
would be higher for both hypothetical firms than in any of the eight urban and six suburban locations studied. Local property taxes in Kankakee, on the other hand, would be among the lowest of the locations
studied. Corporation A would pay over three times as much in Chicago
as in Kankakee and Corporation B, a smaller 'growth' corporation owning little real estate, would pay over five times as much in Chicago as
in Kankakee. These results are caused partly by the higher rates in
Chicago but also reflect significant differences in assessment levels.
4 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §501 (1965) ; Chicago
Daily News, May 20, 1965 at 1, col. 8:
The Revenue Article now requires real estate to be assessed at a
uniform rate.
Cook County, however, has for many years ignored the Constitution
and has assessed real estate at various rates for tax purposes.
Under this system, a manufacturing plant or railroad has been assessed at a higher rate than a home.
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stead, of consistent and deliberate administrative practice administrative practice at all times contrary to the letter of the
law - which has been followed by successive county assessors
and members of the board of appeals. For this reason, the Cook
County system has been termed de facto classification, to distinguish it plainly from de jure classification, i.e., classification authorized by law.5 De facto classification of real property in Cook
County has existed for several decades." Until recently, it was
believed, generally, that such classification was immune to effective legal attack.7 Now, as a result of a series of Illinois Supreme
Court decisions, most notably, the so-called "Railroad Cases," the
possibility exists that classification of real property for purposes
of taxation may be challenged successfully., The purpose of this
article is to explore this possibility, and to consider some of the
practical consequences that would ensue were such possibility to
be realized.
CLASSIFICATION

Classification connotes a division of a given category into
a number of smaller groups or classes having certain common
characteristics. It must be remembered, however, that a given
category often may be divided in several different ways, and for
widely varying purposes. In Cook County, for example, property might be subjected, under the operation of the ad valorem
property tax, to three different types of classification: classification for purposes of assessment; classification for purposes of
administration and collection; and classification for purposes of
5
See Comment, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity
of Taxation, 33 ILL. L. REV. 57, 68-76, 78-79 (1938).
a Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 358, 172 N.E. 772, 774 (1930) (involving taxes for the year 1927; Comment, The Illinois Constitutional
Requirement of Uniformity of Taxation, 33 ILL. REV. 57, 74 (1938):
"Classification according to types of property is likewise common, variations
in levels of assessment occurring between business properties, hotels and
apartments, and homes; between improved and unimproved property."
7 See Carey and Schulyer, The Illinois Taxpayer's "Day in Court," 31
ILL. L. REV. 993, 1007 (1937); Comment, Taxation of Intangibles Under the
Illinois General Property Tax, 35 ILL. L. REV. 716, 724-27 (1941).
8 See note 60 infra; Chicago Sun-Times, May 21, 1965, at 28, col. 1:
The Illinois Supreme Court decided for the first time Thursday that
Cook County had overassessed a railroad for taxation.
The court's ruling in favor of the Burlington Route raised the possibility that the county might lose as much as $34,000,000 in tax money
that other railroads have paid under protest.

In the railroad case, Burlington contended that its property was
being assessed at 100 per cent of its value while the average assessment on other property in the county is 50 per cent.
Democrats have expressed fears that other businesses might take
the railroads' example and challenge Cook County's de facto classification system, thereby threatening wholesale loss of revenues to the
county.
Under the Cook County system, businesses are assessed at generally
higher percentages of their value than homes.
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taxation. For an understanding of the questions posed by this
article, it is necessary that one of these three types of classification, classification of real property for purposes of taxation, be
defined with particular care."
Classification of real property for purposes of taxation connotes a division of real property such that realty included in certain classes will be subject to a higher tax, while realty placed
in other classes will be subject to a lesser tax than would be the
case were there no such classification. Phrased somewhat differently, by such a classification is meant a division of realty calculated to affect markedly the incidence of taxation among the individual pieces of real property so classified. Such classification,
however, is based solely on the characteristics of the real estate
itself. Factors such as the form of ownership of the property,
whether by an individual, partnership or corporation, and the
particular trade or business, if any, of the user are considered
irrelevant.
Within the framework of an annual ad valorem property
tax, such classification might take one of two forms: varying
the rate of the tax from class to class; or levying the same rate
of tax for all classes, but varying the tax base, the percentage
of actual value at which property is assessed for tax purposes,
from class to class. 10
The latter approach is the one followed in Cook County. The
rate of tax varies, of course, by taxing district. However, within
each taxing district in the County, the same rate is applied to the
assessed valuation of all property subject to tax. Classification
is accomplished by varying, from class to class, the percentage
of actual value used in the assessment of the property tax. Thus,
a single family dwelling might be assessed at 35 per cent, a factory at 70 per cent, and a downtown office building at 100 per
cent of their respective actual values. Accordingly, in this article,
9 For an example of classification for purposes of assessment, as distinguished from classification for purposes of taxation, see People ex rel.
Toman v. Pickard, 377 Ill. 610, 614, 37 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1941):
The principle of law upon which the rule of uniformity in taxation
stands does not require that the taxing officials, while engaged in the
fixing of the full fair cash'value of property, shall adopt the same rules
as to all classes of property. They are permitted to exercise their judgment, formulate and apply such rules in the valuing of the various items
of property and the classes thereof as will best enable them to arrive at
the fair cash value of the property which is the subject of assessment.
10 Classification of property! for purposes of taxation also may be incident to a change in the nature of the tax imposed. For example, where
personal property has been classified, the ad valorem property rtax might
be replaced by an excise or an income tax. Thus, it has been suggested
that a recording tax be substituted for the annual personal property tax
upon real estate mortgages, and that an income or yield tax similarly replace the personal property tax on stocks and bonds. See Cushman, The
Proposed Revision of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, 1952 U. ILL.
L. F. 226, 242.
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classification of real property for purposes of taxation specifically
means: a classification system under which the percentages of
actual value used in the assessment of real property vary appre-

ciably, and deliberately, from class to class.
The Constitutionaland Statutory Problems
The basic constitutional provisions governing the taxation
of property in Illinois are contained in section I of "The Revenue
Article."The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its
property - such value to be ascertained by some person or persons,
to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly
shall direct, and not otherwise; but the general assembly shall have
power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants,
commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, inn-keepers, grocery
keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph
and express interests or business, vendors of patents, and persons
or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges, in such
manner as it shall from time to time direct
by general law, uniform
12
as to the class upon which it operates.
Section 1 consists of two clauses. The first clause, ending
with the words, "such value to be ascertained by some person or
persons . . . and not otherwise," governs the taxation of property, both real and personal. The second clause, comprising the
remainder of the section, generally has been construed to relate
to exercise, or nonproperty taxes." However, a number of decisions have interpreted the second clause as also being applicable,
under certain circumstances, to portions of the property tax.'
The first clause makes no reference to "class" or "classification";
the second clause, however, contains the phrase, "uniform as to
the class upon which it operates."
11 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1.
12 Id.
Section 1 is admittedly prolix. However, the supreme court has
supplied the following summary of its provisions:
Closely analyzed, it can be seen there are three general objects
which this section accomplishes: (1) The General Assembly shall provide
for revenue by levying a tax by valuation, so that every taxpayer shall
pay in proportion to the value of his property; (2) the value upon which
the tax is levied shall be ascertained by some person or persons elected
or appointed as the General Assembly shall direct, not otherwise; and
(3) in its discretion the General Assembly shall have the power to tax
a number of occupations or privileges, and persons or corporations owning or using franchises or privileges, in such manner as it shall from
time to time direct by general law, uniform as to the class upon which
it operates.
People ex rel. Prindable v. Union Electric Power Co., 392 Ill. 271, 274,
64 N.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1946).
18 Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 588-91, 182 N.E. 909, 912-13 (1932);
Lucas, Non Property Taxes under the Illinois Constitution, 25 U. CHI. L.
REv. 63, 66-67 (1957).
14 People ex rel. Prindable v. Union Electric Power Co., 392 Ill. 271,
64 N.E.2d 534 (1946); Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R.R.,
76 Ill. 561 (1875) ; see text at notes 28 to 36 infra.
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The first clause of section 1 authorizes only a general, unclassified property tax. Such a tax imposes an equal levy, in
proportion to value, upon all forms and types of property whether real estate, tangible personal property (e.g., automobiles, inventories, machinery and equipment), or intangible personal property ( e.g., bank deposits, stocks, bonds and accounts
receivable) .15 Similarly, the Revenue Act provides that all property, both real estate and personalty, "shall be valued at its fair
cash value."'"
These provisions of the Revenue Article, and of the Revenue
Act, preclude any classification of real property for purposes of
taxation. As indicated above, such classification entails the deliberate assessment of various classes of real estate at different
percentages of actual value. Accordingly, it conflicts with both
the Revenue Article's command that all property be taxed uniformly in proportion to value, and the Revenue Act's requirement that all real property be valued, for tax purposes, at its
fair cash value.
This is not to say that these provisions forbid any classification of real property in relation to the Illinois property tax. As
the supreme court has noted:
While the constitution provides for uniformity, the rule does
not require that the assessments must always be made by the same

officer or class or officers or that the same methods of ascertaining

values must be followed for all classes of property. Thus, the
General Assembly may provide for the assessment of capital stock

of some corporations by the State Board of Equalization or the
Revenue Department
and the capital stock of other corporations by
1
local assessors. "
Consequently, there can be classification for certain administrative purposes, such as assessment. Examples of such classification of real property may be found in the early case of
People ex rel. Lindsey v. Palmer,8 and in the more recent decisions of People ex rel. Lunn V. Chicago Title & Trust Company 9
and Budberg v. County of Sangamon.20 In the Palmer decision,
the court said:
For the purpose of taxation the legislature has classified property, and provided that in the equalization by the county board, 'it
may consider lands, town or city lots, personal property and railroad
property, (except 'railroad track' and 'rolling stock,') separately,
15 Cushman, The Proposed Revision of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 226 235; Comment, The Illinois Constitutional
Requirement of Uniformity of Taxation, 33. ILL. L. REv. 57, 61-62 (1938) ;
People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 357 Ill. 493, 49799, 192 N.E. 645, 647 (1934).
16 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§501, 502 (1965).
17 People 'ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 Ill. 390, 397, 104 N.E.2d 273, 277
(1952).
18 113 Ill. 346, 348, 1 N.E. 830, 831 (1885).
19409 Ill. 505, 515, 100 N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (1951).
20 4 Ill.2d 518, 123 N.E.2d 479 (1955).
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and determine a separate rate per cent of addition or reduction for
each of said classes of property, as may be necessary to a just
equalization of the assessed value of said classes of property within
the respective towns, and 21of the same between the several towns
or districts in the county.'

And in the Lunn case, it was held:
Next, the individual objectors in Warren township attack the
order increasing their assessments upon the ground the increases
were arbitrary and unreasonable, in that the valuations of lands
were raised 25 per cent, and lots 100 per cent. According to these objectors, unsubdivided tracts and lots, all being land, must be treated
uniformly. The short answer to this is that it was necessary to
increase the values of tracts and lots by different percentages in
order to make their assessed valuations uniform. Furthermore,
section 20 of the Revenue Act... , providing for the valuation of
real property, refers to tracts and lots, and subparagraph 5 of section 108 . . in authorizing boards of review to increase an entire
assessment of real property or an included class, does not impose
any limitation upon the classification of real property. The classification of real estate into lands and lots being impliedly authorized
by section 20 and not prohibited by section 108, and being reasonably necessary to equalize the assessment in Warren township, it canboard in so classifying real
not be said that the action of the county
22
estate was arbitrary or capricious.
.

Further, the Revenue Act itself authorizes boards of review to
equalize tax assessments by classes, as well as by area.3
It should be noted that in the above instances, the classification of real property for purposes of assessment was intended to

aid in equalizing real property assessments, so that the property
tax, at least as to real estate, should approximate the objective
set forth in section 1 of the Revenue Article, that "every person
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property." This is in marked contrast, of course, to classification of
real property for purposes of taxation, the basic objective of
which is to create disparities between the respective percentages
of actual value at which various classes of real estate are assessed.
Classification of property for administrative and collection
purposes has also been considered constitutionally permissible.
This accounts for the breakdown of property into two major
categories: real estate and personalty.

Under the Revenue Act,

there would appear clearly to be but a single property tax. All
property, both real and personal, is to be taxed, unless specifically
exempted; all property, whether real or personal, is to be valued
for tax purposes at its fair cash value; and the tax rate, as determined for each taxing district, is to be the same for both real
and personal property.2 4 Yet, the Revenue Act contains so many
separate and distinct provisions for real and personal property,
21

11

22409
23

Ill. 346, 348, 1 N.E. 830, 831 (1885).
Ill. 505, 515, 100 N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (1951).

ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 120, §589(5)
24'Id. §§499, 501, 502, 643.

(1965).
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respectively (see, e.g., the provisions regarding assessments, bills,
liens and suits for collection), that the public generally, and the
legal profession as well, have come to think not of one property
tax, but of two separate and distinct taxes - a real estate tax
and a personal property tax.2 5
Finally, there is the classification specifically authorized by
the phrase, "uniform as to the class upon which it operates,"
contained in the second clause of section 1 of the Revenue Article. This phrase has been cited as the constitutional basis for
the general assembly's power to classify corporations so that
some are assessed, for capital stock purposes, by the Department
of Revenue, and others are so assessed by local authorities. 26
However, the phrase has also been construed, in a series of decisions by the supreme court, to permit other classifications, the
effect of which would not be limited to capital stock assessments.
The first decision in this latter series of cases is Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. County of McLean,'7 decided in 1855. The
latest would appear to be People ex rel. PrindableV. Union Electric Power Company, a 1946 decision.21
The provisions of section 1 of the present Revenue Article
are almost identical to those of section 2, article IX of the Illinois Constitution of 1848. In 1851, the Illinois Central Railroad
Company was chartered by a special act of the General Assembly.
This charter exempted it from all property taxes, local as well as
state, in return for a payment to the state of a special tax of
seven per cent of its gross receipts. In the McLean County case,
the supreme court upheld these charter provisions as against an
attempt by the county to tax the property of the Illinois Central.
The court's opinion analyzed, in detail, the relationship between
what are now the first and second clauses of section 1 of the
Revenue Article. Said the court:
The whole design, as we apprehend the constitution, was to enable
the legislature to make the burden proportionate, by applying a
different rule to these occupations. For peddlers, auctioneers...
may, and most usually do, carry on large sales and exchanges of
property, and at no one time have in possession anything like a fair
proportionate amount of property to their annual sales and
profits, which could be assessed or taxed. So with toll bridges,
ferries . . . showmen and jugglers . . . . Some corporations

invest all the capital used by them in taxable subjects, lands, houses,
machinery, materials and manufactures from them; others have a
portion, while another class, like merchants and others, is in floating, exchangeable values, in goods, produce, and bills and notes;

and others with little taxable property, and large but profitable
credits. Power, then, to make a flexible rule became indispensable
§§511, 529, 671, 675, 697, 699.
The Hub v. Hanberg, 211 Ill. 43, 71 N.E. 826 (1904); Sterling Gas
Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557, 25 N.E. 660 (1890).
27 17 Ill. 291 (Peck 1855).
28 392 Ill. 271, 64 N.E.2d 534 (1946).
25

26

Id.
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to reach and remedy an inequality inseparable from the nature of
these circumstances and irremediable by a uniform and proportionate rule, assessed on actual appraisements of visible property.
Therefore, this general power to tax these, which, when exercised
generally upon all, or specially upon one corporation, may well commute, estimate, include and compound within the rule of assessment,
whatever of real or personal property the individual or corporation
may use in the calling, or with the franchise. 29
In brief, the court held that a tax imposed pursuant to the
second clause of present section 1 might be substituted, in whole
or in part, for the ad valorem property tax otherwise payable
pursuant to the first clause.
Commencing with Porter V. Rockford, Rock Island & St.
Louis Railroad Company, 0 the court ruled that its interpretation
in the McLean County case, of the revenue provisions of the 1848
constitution, also applied to section 1 of the present Revenue Article.31
The latest, and most complete statement of the court's interpretation of section 1, in light of the McLean County line of authorities, is contained in the following two paragraphs from its
opinion in the Union Electric Power Company case:
The general principle of uniformity applies to both clauses of
section 1 but does not of necessity apply to them in combination. In
other words, as to all property assessed and valued under the first
clause the ratio must be uniform, whether actual value or debased
value is taken. The same principle of uniformity applies to valuations fixed under the last clause of section 1, but the difference
between the two is that the General Assembly may as to certain
subjects create, by general law, classes of taxpayers, and in such
cases the uniformity required must conform to all coming within
that class, but need not be uniform in method or amount of assessment with the other classes, or with the
property coming under the
2
first clause of section 1 of article IX.3
The potential of the McLean County line of cases, as exceptions to the uniformity requirement of section 1 of the Revenue
Article is indicated by the factual circumstances of the Union
Electric Power Company decision. In that case, the taxpayer
was taxed by virtue of an assessment made by the Department of
Revenue on the basis of 54 per cent of the fair cash value of its
capital stock, even though its locally assessed property (real estate and tangible personal property), was assessed at but 35 per
cent. This was done even though corporations assessed locally for
capital stock purposes in the same county wherein the taxpayer
maintained its principal office, were likewise assessed at but 34
per cent of the cash value of their capital stock. Also of interest
was the court's interpretation of its earlier decision in Mobile &
17 I1. 291, 293-94 (Peck 1855).
76 Ill. 561 (1875).
31 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finney, 124 Ill. 666, 17 N.E. 11 (1888); Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557, 25 N.E. 660 (1890) ; The Hub v. Hanberg,
211 Ill. 43, 71 N.E. 826 (1904).
32 392 Ill. 271, 286-88, 64 N.E.2d 534, 540-41 (1946).
29

30

220

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 1:212

Ohio Railroad Company V. State Tax Commission.33 The two decisions, when read together, indicate that the Department of
Revenue was free to assess railroad property at any given percentage of its actual value, without regard to the respective percentages of actual value used to assess other real property in the
counties in which a railroad's property might be located, and in
which it would pay a property tax.
However, the McLean County line of cases, in general, and
the Union Electric Power Company case, in particular, afford no
support for the de facto classification system presently existing as
to Cook County real property.
The classification authorized by the second clause of section
1, on which clause the McLean County decisions depend, is
classification by "classes of taxpayers, ' 34 such as classification
based upon the occupation or trade of the user of the property,
or whether such user is or is not a corporation and not classification by type of property, as is true of the Cook County system.
Moreover, the power to classify, granted by that clause, is vested
in the general assembly, not in the local assessing authorities; and
the general assembly has made most sparing use of it. Specifically,
the general assembly has not sought to use its power under this
clause to differentiate among categories of property, as is indicated by the provisions in the Revenue Act which require that
all property, both real and personal, be valued, for tax purposes,
at fair cash value.
In People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Company,3 5 the first of the so-called "Railroad Cases,"
the county sought to invoke the Union Electric Power Company
decision to justify the discrimination of which the railroad complained. The court rejected the county's argument quite summarily:
Before dealing with the main substantive question, it is necessary to dispose of one further argument of plaintiff. Plaintiff, relying on certain language in People ex rel. Prindablev. Union Electric
Power Co.... argues that the constitution does not require railroad property to be assessed and taxed uniformly with other
property, but that railroad property is a separate class, and
that all that the constitution requires is uniformity within the
class. Whether the legislature might constitutionally have provided for the assessment of railroad property at its full value while
other property is assessed at only 55% of full value is not before us.
The legislature has not so provided. The statute requires all property
to be assessed at its full value, and the trial court found that the
Department has failed to comply with the statute. It remains to be
the findings of the trial court are supported by
considered whether
the evidence. 86
33 374 Ill. 75, 28 N.E.2d 100 (1940).

34392 Ill. 271, 286, 64 N.E.2d 534, 540 (1946).
3522 Ill.2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961).•
86 Id. at 96, 174 N.E.2d at 178.
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Briefly, classification of property for purposes of taxation,
as presently practiced in Cook County, clearly violates both the
first clause of section 1 of the Revenue Article, and the Revenue
Act, and finds no support in the special and restricted classification power granted to the general assembly by the second clause
of section 1 of the Revenue Article.
Although some classifications of real property have been
authorized by the Revenue Act, or inferentially recognized by the
courts as permissible under the first clause of section 1, all such
classifications have been consistent with the basic uniformity
requirement of that section. In accord with that basic requirement have been the many pronouncements of the Illinois Supreme
Court construing section 1 of the Revenue Article; and except for
very rare, and distinguishable dicta, the court has never deviated
from the view that the first clause of section 1 requires all prop7
erty to be taxed uniformly.
Judicial Review
Probably the single most distinguishing feature of the classification of real property for purposes of taxation, is that certain real property is taxed more heavily and other real property
is taxed more lightly, than if there were no such classification.
That is to say, such classification has both its beneficiaries and
its victims, with the benefits to the former being paid for by the
latter, by way of higher real estate taxes.
Since this aspect of the Cook County real property classification system is well known, especially to those adversely affected by it, and because of the obvious conflict existing between
such classification and the explicit requirements of section 1 of
the Revenue Article, the question naturally arises: how did such
37 The dicta are in People ex rel. Toman v. Olympia Fields Country
Club, 374 Ill. 101, 103, 28 N.E.2d 109, 110 (1940): "No prohibition against
classification of property and taxpayers into different classes can be read
into the constitution"; and People v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 377 Ill.
303, 307, 36 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1941) : "The Constitution does not prohibit
a classification of property and taxpayers." See Cohn, Constitutional Limitations on Income Taxation in Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 586, 611, citing
both the Olympia Fields and Southwestern Bell decisions:
A tax on income as property would assume the validity of legislative
power to classify property for purposes of taxation. It is not seriously
suggested by any student of the problem that such a power exists, notwithstanding some judicial dicta to the contrary.
Comment, Taxation of Intangibles in Illinois, 35 ILL. L. REV. 716, 726 n. 57
(1941), referring to Olympia Fields:

The court may have confused the permissive classification which the

Constitution authorizes (when certain specified classes of business are
to be taxed by the legislature) in the second half of §1 of Article IX,
with the uniformity requirement of the first half of that section.
For similar comments on the Southwestern Bell decision, see Troupis,
Full Fair Value Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REv. 160, 177-78 n. 101
(1949); Young, Taxpayers' Remedies, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 248, 271.
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classification come to be, and how has it managed to survive so
long?
The answer is to be found in the restrictive nature of the
Revenue Article's provisions regarding judicial review of the
valuations - that is to say, of the assessments made by the officers administering the property tax. The first clause of section 1 of the Revenue Article provides:
The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be
needful by levying a tax, by valuation ... such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in
such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise .... 88

The courts have held, consistently, that under this provision of
the Revenue Article, they have no power, in the absence of fraud,
to review or redetermine the value of property as fixed for purposes of taxation by the assessing officials. A leading, and early
case on this point is Republic Life Insurance Company v. Pollak9
in which the court said:
Nor is there any power, expressed or implied, by which the

courts can fix a valuation, or review the action of the assessors ...
When those officers have acted it is final, and the tax payer must
submit to the action of the officer who is clothed with the sole power
to make the estimate of the value, unless he show it was fraudulently made ...

40

A recent and succinct restatement of this proposition is contained
in People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Company :41
We have consistently held that the taxation of property is a legislative rather than a judicial function, and under section 1 of article
IX of the Illinois constitution, the courts, in the absence of fraud,
have no power to review or determine the value of property fixed

by the appropriate elected or appointed adfor purposes of taxation
2
ministrative officers.4

One consequence of section .1, so construed, is the absence
from the Illinois property tax system of any direct judicial review of the valuations placed upon property by the local assessors. An administrative appeal to the board of review in counties
other than Cook and to the board of appeals in Cook County, is
provided, 43 but further direct appeal to the courts from the valuato protions of the local assessor is not allowed, and all attempts
44
vide such further direct judicial review have failed.
Notwithstanding this absence of direct judicial review of lo38

ILL. CONST. art.

IX, §1.

39
40
41
42

75 Ill. 292 (Freeman 1875).
Id. at 295.
34 Ill.2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966).
Id. at 376, 215 N.E.2d at 235.
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§588-589, 598, 599 (1965) ; there is, however,
direct judicial review of original assessment made by the Department of
Revenue. Id. §§619, 620.

44 Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, 185 Ill. 276, 279, 56 N.E.

1049, 1050 (1900) ; Sanitary District of Chicago v. Board of Review of Will
County, 258 Ill. 816, 318, 101 N.E. 555 (1913).
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cal assessments, a large number of cases have arisen in which
the validity of the real property tax has been contested, often
successfully, on the ground that the valuation placed upon the
property by the local assessing officials was excessive.4 5 Such
litigation has taken the form either of a suit to enjoin the collection of the tax, or of objections to the county collector's application for judgment and an order of sale.46 As a practical matter,

these cases have constituted indirect judicial review of real property assessments.
It is difficult to evaluate the significance of this distinction
between direct judicial review of local real estate assessments,
which is prohibited, and indirect judicial review, which is
allowed. One practical consequence probably has been the
characterization of the remedy sought by the taxpayer as extraordinary, thereby emphasizing the burden of proof upon him, and
the necessity that all conditions precedent to bringing suit, such
as the exhaustion of administrative remedies, be complied with
fully.
The grounds upon which the courts will grant such "indirect" judicial review of real estate assessments, and relieve
thereby against excessive valuations, are defined by a considerable body of decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court. Common,
and basic, to all these decisions is the requirement that the offending assessment be shown to be fraudulent. 47 An examination
of the cases shows, however, that a large proportion of the situations embraced within the nominal term, "fraudulent," did not involve moral turpitude on the part of the assessing authorities,
but on the other hand did involve more than a mere difference of
opinion between the assessors and the courts, as to the proper
valuation, for purposes of taxation, of specific real property. In
brief, indirect judicial review has come to be based, not solely on
proof of "actual" fraud, but also on a showing of constructive
fraud.

48

Of course, the clearest case for indirect judicial review of
real estate assessments has always been that of actual fraud for example, that the assessor's motive in making the assessment
in question had been dishonest or corrupt. Thus, it might be
shown that the assessor had deliberately made an excessive assessment after failing in efforts to extort money from the taxpayer under threat of making just such an assessment. 49 How45 Cushman, The Judicial Review of Valuation in Illinois Property Tax
Cases, 35 ILL. REV. 689 (1941).
46 Young, Taxpayer's Remedies, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 248, 274-78.
47 Cushman, supra note 45 at 689-90.
48 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §922 (5th ed.) (1941).
49 New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill. 383, 388, 390-91, 51
N.E. 629, 630-31 (1898).
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ever, cases in which actual fraud can be alleged and proved are
rare; and if the power of the courts to review and reduce excessive assessments were limited to such instances, judicial review, whether direct or indirect, would be practically nonexistent.
On the other hand, since the need for some form of judicial
relief from flagrant overassessments has usually been only too
manifest, the courts early began to substitute constructive fraud
for actual fraud as the principal basis for indirect judicial review
of real property assessments. By a gradual process of judicial
decision, the courts have come to grant judicial relief against a
wide variety of arbitrary, although in fact nonfraudulent, valuations of real property by local assessors.50
At present, it would appear that the grounds which the
courts have accepted for indirect judicial review from excessive
real property assessments may be classified under the following
six categories, the latter five of which have been held to imply
constructive fraud:
(a) Actual fraud:
(b) Assessment so excessive it could not have been honestly made;
(c)
Assessment made by mere will without the exercise of judgment;
(d) Assessment arbitrarily made in disregard of recognized elements of value;
(e) Assessment made in violation of rules; and
(f) Intentional and systematic discrimination. 51
Translating the above general categories into specific examples is difficult. It was generally believed, until the "Railroad
Cases,' 52 that judicial relief, solely on the ground of flagrantly excessive assessment, was unlikely unless the assessment in question
was at a percentage of actual value three to four times as great
as the prevailing, or average level of assessment.5 3 In Cook
County, where the prevailing level of assessment is about 50
per cent of the actual value of the property, this would mean that
a specific parcel would have to be assessed at from 150 to 200
per cent of its actual value before the courts would intervene on
the ground of constructive fraud.
The other recognized categories of constructive fraud are
even more difficult to translate into concrete terms. Most of
them have turned on specific factual circumstances, and the showing, or more usually the lack thereof, made by the authorities in
defense of particular assessments. Moreover, in evaluating the
prospects of obtaining judicial relief, a taxpayer aggrieved by
50 Cushman, sup'a note 45 at 691; e.g., Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill.

602, 609-10 (1876).
51 Young, supra note 46 at 269; Cushman, supra note 45 at 690-91.
52
See note 60 infra.
53 See Gale, Assessment and Collection of Taxes, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 192,
196; Comment, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in
Taxation, 33 ILL. L. RzV. 57, 67, n.60 (1938).
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the operation of the Cook County classification system must also
consider the following general propositions:
1. The well-established rule is that the courts are not concerned
with a "mere difference of opinion as to value," between the taxpayer and the assessor. The supreme court recently affirmed this
rule when it stated:
When valuation has been fraudulently made it is subject to judicial
review, but more is required for this purpose than merely showing
an overvaluation. . . . Before the conduct of the taxing authorities
will be considered constructive fraud, the evidence must clearly establish that the assessment was made in ignorance of the value of
the property, or on a judgment not based upon readily ascertainable
facts, or on a designedly excessive basis.
• . . If property has been assessed higher than it should have
been through a mere error of judgment on the part of the officers
making the valuation, the courts are54powerless to rectify the error.
They can relieve only against fraud.
In brief, judicial review is not available to resolve contests between groups of expert witnesses, i.e. the appraisers retained by
the taxpayer, on the one hand, as against those in the employ of
the county assessor, on the other. If a case narrows down to
such a contest, the taxpayer will almost surely lose.
2. The rule is also well established that the nonassessment or
underassessment of other property is no ground for relief.
The contention that the assessments upon the lots and parcels of
real estate of the appellants are void because there was discrimination in favor of personal property is not tenable. It has been the
uniform rule in this State that neither the omission to assess nor the
under-valuation of one kind or class of property will invalidate the
assessments upon other property in the same jurisdiction. 55

The most notable application of this proposition was in the taxstrike cases of the early 1930's, where the principal issue was
the general omission of personal property from the tax rolls. 56

This rule means, as a practical matter, for example, in a
suit challenging the assessment of an office building at 90 per
cent of its fair cash value, that it is irrelevant that there are in
the same community numerous bungalows and two-fiats which
are assessed at but 20 to 25 per cent of their fair cash values.
On the other hand, although the underassessment of other

specific property is no ground for judicial relief, a taxpayer is
entitled to relief if he can prove that his real estate has been
assessed at a greater proportion of its fair cash value than the

proportion at which real property generally has been assessed."'
54 People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill.2d 209, 211, 221 N.E.
2d 650, 652 (1966).
55 Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 634, 181 N.E. 417, 421 (1932).
56 See Kent, Tax Litigation in Illinois, 1 U. CHi. L. REV. 698, 699-706
(1934).
57 E.g., People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 357
Ill. 493, 497-99, 192 N.E. 645, 647 (1934) ; People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v.
Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 176, 121 N.E. 629, 633 (1919) ; Chicago & Alton R.R.
v. Livingston County, 68 Ill. 458, 460 (1873).
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3. The burden of proof is on the objecting taxpayer. This is
no slight matter, particularly in a jurisdiction as large and complex as Cook County. The very quantum of evidence which can
be required to establish a given factual proposition, such as the
prevailing level of assessment for real property generally, or for
a particular type of real property can be overwhelming.58 Moreover, in litigation involving as vital a matter as the classification
system, it must be assumed that those defending the assessment
will concede or stipulate to very little. Thus all aspects of the
taxpayer's case probably will have to be proved, and in detail.
These various rules, delimiting judicial review of real estate assessments, have operated to establish a protected area of
administrative discretion. Operating within this area, successive
county assessors of Cook County have erected and maintained
the de facto classification system.
As pointed out in the preceding section of this article, the
Cook County classification system designedly assesses different
types, or classes, of real property at varying percentages of actual
value. The very existence of such differences in assessment
rates, as between classes of real property, presupposes in turn
that certain classes will be assessed at percentages of actual
value greater than the average percentage at which real property, taken in the aggregate, is assessed. That is to say, the
classification of property for purposes of taxation entails, necessarily, that there be one or more classes of real property which
are assessed at percentages of actual value greater than the
average percentage, applicable to all real property. Basic, therefore, to such classification is a power in the county assessor to
cause certain types or classes of real property to be assessed at
a greater percentage of actual value than that applicable to real
estate generally. No such power is vested in the assessor by the
Revenue Act, which, to the contrary, requires that each tract
of real property, without exception, be valued at its fair cash
value; nor could such power be granted to him by statute, consistent with the uniformity requirement of section 1 of the Revenue Article. 59 The power thus exists in a negative sense only,
in the inability of persons aggrieved by its exercise to obtain
judicial relief from the consequences of its use.
Thus, the Cook County system of de facto classification of
real property depends, in the final analysis, upon the inability
of those who are subjected, pursuant to that system, to aboveaverage assessments, to obtain judicial relief from such over58 See Parham, Taxation of Property in Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 645,
648-49.
59 Comment, The Illinois Constitutional Requirement of Uniformity in
Taxation, 33 ILL. L. REV. 57, 70 (1938).
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assessments. To the extent that the ability of such persons to
obtain judicial relief is increased, the scope, or area of operation, of the de facto system is diminished; in the event that they
should become entitled, generally, to judicial relief from all such
overassessments, the system would collapse.
In this latter consideration lies the significance of the socalled "Railroad Cases," for these cases made significant changes,
primarily in the adjective law regarding judicial review of real
property assessments. These changes have increased substantially the rights of those aggrieved by overassessments, particularly those overassessments which are made in deliberate
furtherance of an established policy - such as a definite classification system.
The "Railroad Cases" -

FirstPhase

The term "Railroad Cases" has been applied to a group of
seven decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court during the years
1961 to 1965.60 To better understand this group of cases, three
earlier decisions of the court should first be considered: Chicago
and North Western Railway Company v. Department of Revenue,6 1 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Department of Revenue6 and People ex rel. Callahanv. Gulf, Mobile
& Ohio Railroad Company.63 These three cases, which were the
precursors of the Railroad Cases proper, differ from the latter in
the vital consideration that in these earlier cases the taxpayers did
not prevail. However, both affirmatively and negatively, these
earlier decisions heralded the legal theory, the procedure and
the actual showing which were to enable the railroad taxpayers
to prevail in the later case.4
Pursuant to special Revenue Act provisions railroad property is assessed by the Department of Revenue, an agency of
the State government. 65 All other real estate is "locally as60 People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 22 Ill.
2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961); People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
R.R., 22 Ill.2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961); People ex Tel. Dallas v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R., 26 Ill.2d 292, 186 N.E.2d 335 (1962); People
-ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 28 Ill.2d 205, 190 N.E.2d 780
(1963) ; People ex rel. Enrietta v. Gulf Mobile & Ohio R. R., 29 Ill.2d 605,
195 N.E.2d 174 (1964); People ex rel. Korzen v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R., 32 Ill.2d 554, 209 N.E.2d 649 (1965) ; People ex rel. Musso v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 33 Ill.2d 88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965).
61 6 Ill.2d 278, 128 N.E.2d 722, cert denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1955).
6217 Ill.2d 376, 161 N.E.2d 838 (1959).
63 8 Ill.2d 66, 132 N.E.2d 544, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956).
64 There should also be noted, if only in passing, a belated Railroad Case,
decided earlier this year. People ez rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry., 37 Ill.2d
158, 226 N.E.2d 265 (1967). This decision, however, added little, if anything,
to the principles established by the earlier opinions of the supreme court in
the Railroad Cases.
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §564 (1965).
The "non-carrier" real estate of a railroad, however, is assessed by the local assessing officer in the
taxing district where located.
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sessed." The valuation of a railroad's property is first determined as a unit, and an allocation is then made between its Illinois property and its property not subject to taxation in this
state. When the assessments of railroad property finally are
determined by the Department, such assessments are distributed
among local taxing districts in accordance with the provisions
of the Act.86
With regard to locally assessed real estate, the Revenue Act
requires the Department of Revenue to lower or to raise the
total assessed value of property in each county as returned by
the county clerk so that such property will be assessed at its
full, fair cash value.6 7 When the Department completes its equalization, it is required to certify to the county clerk of each county
a multiplier to bring the assessments of that county to 100 per
cent of full value, which multiplier the county clerk is required
to apply to the assessed valuation of property in his county, as
revised by the board of review, or board of appeals, as the case
6 8
may be.

These provisions of the Revenue Act, in their present form,
66 Id. §567.
The equalized assessed value of the operating property and non-operating personalty of every Railroad Company subject to assessment, when
determined as prescribed in Section 80 of this Act, shall be listed and
taxed in the several taxing districts in the proportion that the length of
all the track owned or used in such taxing district bears to the whole
length of all the track owned or used in this state, except the value of
all station houses, depots, machine shops and other buildings of an original cost exceeding $1,000, which shall be deemed to have a situs in the
taxing district in which the same are located.
67 People ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 Ill. 390, 397, 400-01, 104 N.E.2d
273, 277, 279 (1952):
The duty of the Department of Revenue in establishing uniformity
of taxation is not an assessment duty, but an equalizing duty. It has
nothing to do with the levying of taxes. It only equalizes the assessed
valuations of property so that taxation throughout the State will be uniform for those taxpayers who must pay upon a State-wide assessed
valuation.
It seems to us that the appellee, as well as the trial court, entirely overlooked the province and duty of the Department of Revenue in applying
the equalization formula to the several counties in the State. A large
part of the property is taxed on a valuation basis by the local assessors.
A considerable part of the corporate property of the State is taxed by
the Department of Revenue on a State-wide basis in order to preserve
uniformity of the burden of taxation. The mandate of the constitution
requires that the ratio of assessed valuations to actual value of the
property in the several counties be equalized so each will bear its fair
burden. It is for this purpose, among others, that the Department of
Revenue is required to scan the assessments in each county, and from
information, rules, examinations, sales and analyses determine how near
each county comes to assessing the property at its estimated fair cash
value .... He [appellee] calls our attention to State Board of Equalization v. People ex rel. Goggin, 191 Ill. 528, and Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591, which do not relate to the present subject
in any way. Those two cases were questions of original assessment of
property required to be made by the State Board of Equalization....
Equalization was not involved.
68 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§627, 629a, 630, 632, 642 (1965).
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are largely a product of the Butler Bills, enacted by the general
assembly in 1945.69 The history and purpose of this legislation
was set forth in Anderson v. City of Park Ridge :70
For several years prior to the enactment of . . . [the Butler
Bills] the law directed that all property should be assessed for tax
purposes at its full cash value. Notwithstanding the explicit command of the statute, a practice was followed whereby the assessing
officers of the several counties fixed the assessed value at less than
full value. The assessing officers of the several counties, acting independently of the officers of other counties, determined the ratio of
assessed value to full value in their respective counties. The result
was that there was a wide variance between the high and low ratios.
When the State Tax Commission and its successor, the Department
of Revenue, undertook to assess property within its taxing jurisdiction, such as railroad property which was located in several counties,
it encountered the difficulty arising from such difference in ratios in
the several counties ...
... [Consequently] the General Assembly made a survey and
study of the general taxing situation and particularly in reference
to the uniformity in valuing property. Following such consideration, . . .[the Butler Bills] were adopted. There is no doubt that in
the adoption of such acts the General Assembly intended to correct
the irregularities appearing in the assessment of property. The first
objective was to change the law to require a stricter compliance with
the direction to value property at its full, fair market value. To accomplish this, local assessing officers were, as formerly, commanded
to assess at full value. Section 146 was amended in 1945 to give the
Department of Revenue greater power in its equalization work....
The duty was enjoined on the Department to annually ascertain
and determine the percentage relationship for each county between
the valuations at which property had been assessed by the local assessing officers as revised by the boards of review or boards of appeal, as the case might be, and the estimated full, fair cash value of
such property. To ascertain the full, fair cash value of property in
any given county, the Department was empowered to determine it by
comparison of assessed valuations as revised by boards of review and
boards of appeal. In the determination of the full value of property
in a particular county it was authorized to make estimates of full
value by analysis of property transfers, property appraisals and such
other sources as to the Department should seem proper and reasonable. The third paragraph of said section 146 provides that when the
Department has ascertained and determined the ratio which the local
assessed value of each county bears to the full, fair cash value it shall
ascertain the amount to be added to or deducted from the aggregate
assessment as fixed by the local assessing officers. The purpose as
stated in the statute is 'to produce a ratio of assessed to full, fair
cash value equivalent to one hundred per cent.' The result thus obtained is certified to the county clerk of the particular county and becomes the basis for the extension of taxes in that county for the year
covered by the certificate. 7 '
The legislative decision was plain: all real property, including both locally assessed real estate and railroad property assessed:by the Department of Revenue was to be assessed at 100
per cent of its actual value. Specifically, the older practice of
69 See Troupis, Full Fair Value Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REv.
160 (1949).
'70:396 Ill. 235, 72 N.E.2d 210 (1947).
71
Id. at 245-46, 72 N.E.2d at 215-16.
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value was
assessing (and equalizing) real property below full
72
to be abolished on both the local and the state level.
The practical operation of the Illinois property tax system,
however, has been at considerable variance with this legislative
intent. The Department of Revenue was reasonably faithful,
it would appear, in assessing railroad property at 100 per cent
of its actual value. 73 The Department was less assiduous in the
case of locally assessed real estate. Such property came to be
assessed, county'by county, at 50 to 55 per cent of actual value,
even after application of the multiplier specified by the Department.74 The result was that railroad property came to be taxed
at an effective rate considerably in excess of that imposed upon
locally assessed real estate.
.
The railroads of the State commenced, more than a dozen
years ago, a series of lawsuits challenging this situation. As
indicated above, their first efforts, as reflected by the decisions
of the supreme court in the precursor "Railroad Cases," were unavailing. However, during the years 1961 to 1965, in the Railroad Cases proper, the supreme court ruled consistently and decisively in favor of the taxpayer railroads.
The railroads had first to resolve two interrelated questions
of substance and procedure. The substantive question concerned
the nature of their grievance-was railroad property overvalued,
for purposes of taxation, or was locally assessed property undervalued? The railroad industry was convinced that it bore a
disproportionate share of Illinois property taxation; but railroad valuation involves so many intangible factors that there
was uncertainty, apparently,' as to where the emphasis properly
should be placed - whether on the excessive assessment of railroad property by the Department of Revenue, or on the insufficient value assigned, for tax purposes, to locally assessed property, even after application of the multiplier certified by the
Department.
72 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Dep't of Revenue, 17 Ill.2d 376,
390-91, 161 N.E;.2d 838,847 (1959):
What the Court referred to as, the 'Recognized Custom' of the State
Board of Equalization and the Tax Commission in prior years, to debase
or equalize assessed valuations of railroad operating property below
full value in 'order to achieve uniformity with local assessments, is no
longer permissible under the Revenue Act . . . With the enactment
of the Butler Amendments to the Revenue Act of 1945, the General Assembly required that all valuations upon Which tax rates are extended
must be at full, fair cash value. It is the duty of the Department of
Revenue to carry out the statutory mandate. Assessments made by the
Department must be at full Value, . : . and local assessments must be
equalized by the Department to full value by increasing or reducing' the
aggregate assessed yaluations made in the several counties.
7 People 'ex rel. Musso v. Chicago, Burlington '& Quincy R.R., 33 Ill.2d
88, 210
74 N.E.2d 196 (1965).
E.g., People ex 'el. Hillison v. Chicago,: Burlington & Quincy R.R., 22

Ill.2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961).
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If the question was determined to be one of overassessment
of railroad property by the Department, an aggrieved taxpayer
was very likely limited, by way of remedy, to a proceeding under
the Administrative Review Act.7 5 On the other hand, if the matter was considered to be one of undervaluation, for tax purposes,
of locally assessed property - for example, that railroad property was assessed by the Department at 100 per cent of its actual value, with locally assessed property, even after application
of the Department's multiplier, assessed at but 50 per cent of
its actual value - it was possible that alternative remedies would
be available. One procedure would then be judicial review, under
the Administrative Review Act, of the Department's orders certifying multipliers to the several counties in which the railroad
owned property, to the end that the locally assessed property in
those counties would also be assessed at 100 per cent of its actual
value; the other procedure would be to seek relief, county by
county, upon the applications of the several county collectors for
judgment for taxes paid under protest, by way of objections
charging fraudulent and unconstitutional discrimination in the
assessment of the railroad's property. 7

The railroads appear

to have tried all three of these procedures.
In Chicago and North Western Railway Company v. Department of Revenue,7" a proceeding brought under the Administrative Review Act, the taxpayer sought only to challenge the assessment of its property made by the Department of Revenue, with
particular emphasis on the alleged defects in the valuation formula employed by the Department. The trial court ruled for the
taxpayer railroad, and reduced the assessed value of its property
in Illinois from $86,750,000 to $50,000,000 - a reduction of approximately 40 per cent. The supreme court, on appeal, reversed.
The court's opinion, generally speaking, was not favorable towards efforts to challenge, by direct judicial review, the value
placed on railroad property by the Department of Revenue.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Depart75 See People ex rel. Chicago & North Western Ry. v. Hulman, 31 Ill.
2d 166, 201 N.E.2d 103 (1964); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill.2d
477, 479-81, 202 N.E.2d 543, 545-46 (1964); People ex rel. Cain v. Illinois
Central R.R., 33 Ill.2d 232, 210 N.E.2d 516 (1965), in which the court said:
It is apparent that both the Chicago & North Western and Lana

cases were concerned with the availability of the tax objection procedure
when the objection involved an attack on the amount of an original assessment. In the case now before us, the railroad has raised no issue
as to the amount of the original assessment of its property by the Department of Revenue . . . . The railroad's contention in this case is
that discriminatory multipliers were applied to locally assessed property

with the result that the equalized value of the locally assessed property
was considerably less than its full fair cash value.
Id. at 234, 210 N.E.2d at 517.
76 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Dep't of Revenue, 17 Ill.2d 376,
391, 161 N.E.2d 838, 847-48 (1959).
77 6 Ill.2d 278, 128 N.E.2d 722, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1955).

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

232

[Vol. 1:212

ment of Revenue18 was also a proceeding brought under the Administrative Review Act. As in the North Western Railway case,
the taxpayer challenged, as excessive, the assessment of its property made by the Department of Revenue. On this issue the taxpayer succeeded, if only to a slight extent, in the trial court, which
set aside the Department's assessment of $147,000,000 "at least
-to; the extent it exceeded .. .$144,600,000."

But the supreme

court, as in the North Western Railway case, reversed the trial
court on this issue.
However, in the Burlington case, the taxpayer had also
raised, as an alternative issue, the question of undervaluation of
locally assessed property

:79

The plaintiff's final contention is that once the Department has
determined the 'fair cash value' of its operating property it must
then equalizelfts assessed valuation so that the valuation certified to
th6l' cal taxing units will be uniform with locally assessed valuations, as equalized by the Department. Underlying this contention
is;the allegation that the Department does not equalize local assessm ents to full value as the Revenue Act requires it to do each year.
.To support this allegation the plaintiff presented evidence at the
:hearing 'before the Department to. the effect that the equalized assessed value of real estate in Illinois in 1955 was approximately 50%
of its full, fair cash value. If this charge can be substantiated, as to
1957 assessments, the plaintiff's operating property is bearing a disproportionate share of its tax burden in violation of the constitutional requ irement of uniformity.
•.
. The Department, however, refused to consider the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that the hearing requested by the plaintiff was
concerned with the Department's duty,to assess the value of railroad
to equalize local assessoperating property and not with its' duty
mhents throughout the State to full value.80
The supreme court also sustained the Department on this alternative point, but on narrow procedural grounds, and indicated
that the taxpayer had valid grounds of complaint which it might
advance, either in further administrative proceedings before the
Department, or by way of objections in the separate legal proceedings brought by the several county collectors for judgment. 81
We think the Department was correct. It has no authority to reduce its assessed valuation of the plaintiff's property to less than full
value. And the time sequence prescribed by the Revenue Act for
local assessment of property makes it unlikely that the various
county equalization factors will have been determined -at the time
that the Department is valuing railroad property.

. .

. But appro-

priate remedies are available if the plaintiff's property is in fact
bearing a disproportionate share of the tax burden in some taxing
districts. Plaintiff may petition the Department for a reconsideration of the equalization multiplier certified to a county clerk for application to local assessments. . . . And such an objection 'may also
application ,for judgment and order
be raised to a county collector's
82
of sale of its real estate.
'7817 Ill.2d 376, 161 N.E.2d 838 (1959).
79 Id.
80 Id.

at 390-91, 161 N.E.2d at 847.

81 Id. at 391, 161 N.E.2d at 847-48.
82 Id.
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The principal precursor case, however, was People ex rel.
Callahanv. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio RailroadCompany.8 8 In this case
the taxpayer appellant had filed objections in the county court
of Madison County to the county collector's application for judgment and order of sale of real estate based on delinquentn6npayment of taxes for the year 1951. A motion by the collector
to strike the objections was sustained and, thereafter, the court
entered judgment against the taxpayer for the amount of tax
it previously had paid under protest. The taxpayer appealed.
The substance of the taxpayer's position, both in the trial
court and on appeal, was that its property, which had been assessed at its full, fair cash value by the Department of Revenue,
had been "excessively and illegally taxed when locally assessed
property in the county was fraudulently and intentionally undervalued at less than full, fair cash value.1' 4 The objections further
alleged that the fraud was brought about when the county assessing authorities knowingly assessed local property at a small percentage of its actual value and the Department of Revenue intentionally affixed a multiplier "which would produce a debased
equalized and assessed valuation not to exceed 60 per cent of the
'85
full, fair cash value of locally assessed property.
The supreme court directed its attention first to the procedural question and concluded that the taxpayer railroad had
pursued a proper remedy, stating that "the question of discrimination in assessments may properly be raised on an application
for judgment for delinquent taxes."8' 8 The court next summarized
the applicable principles delimiting the scope of judicial review
of tax assessments:
Where an assessment is sought to be impeached for fraud, the burden is on the objector to show either actual fraud by clear and sufficient evidence, or to show that an assessment is so grossly excessive
as to amount to evidence of fraud and an indication that the taxing
authorities, in making the same, wilfully and intentionally discriminated against the said objector. . . . Although the foregoing cases
speak only in terms of fraudulent overvaluation of property, we are
of the opinion that logic and justice require that the same established principles apply where an assessment is sought
to be im8
peached on the grounds of fradulent undervaluation. 7
Having thus defined the conditions for judicial intervention,
the court proceeded to review the taxpayer's pleadings, and concluded that the allegations contained therein were inadequate for
the purpose:
Considering next the question of whether appellant's final pleading is sufficient to make a showing of constructive fraud, we find it
alleged generally that locally assessed property was valued, assessed
83 8 Ill.2d 66, 132 N.E.2d 544, ce'rt. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956).
84

Id. at 68, 182 N.E.2d at 546.

85 Id.

86
8 7 Id.

at 69, 132 N.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 70, 182 N.E.2d 547.
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and equalized at not exceeding sixty percent of its full, fair cash
value, whereas appellant's property was assessed and equalized at the
full, fair cash value thereof. By means of a schedule, drawn by appellant and incorporated into the objections, it is specifically alleged
that the full, fair cash value of all locally assessed property amounted
to $827,453,141 for the year 1951, but that all of such property had
been placed on the Madison County tax rolls for that year in an
amount totalling only $496,471,885. . . . It is appellant's contention
that the 330 million dollar discrepancy in the reckoning of locally
assessed property values is so gross as to demonstrate that the tax-.
ing authorities could not have been honest in their valuation, thus
entitling appellant to relief from a constructive fraud. We are of
the opinion, however, that the rule of law contended for cannot be
applied to the case made out by the bare allegations of value relied
upon.
.. There are no facts alleged which either afford a basis for
accepting the allegation that local property was assessed at other
than its full, fair cash value, or which would permit a 88court to make
the comparison in values the appellant seeks to draw.

In summary, the three precursor cases - North Western,
Burlington and Callahan
established the following propositions:
1. There was little or no. prospect. of demonstrating, on direct
judicial review, that the Department of Revenue had overvalued a railroad's property in Illinois. Better, by far, to
assume that the, Department had done what the statute com-

manded

-

assessed such property at its full, fair cash value,

and to proceed accordingly.
2. Assuming that a railroad company was assessed at 100 per
cent of its actual value, and that locally assessed property was
assessed at but 50 to 55 per cent of its actual value - then,
in that event, the railroad's property was bearing a disproportionate share of the tax burden in violation of the constitutional requirements of uniformity, and "appropriate
remedies are available. ''89

3.

Alternative remedies existed, by which a railroad might establish that locally assessed property was in fact undervalued
for purposes of taxation. More important, one of these remedies was a proceeding before the local county court, by way
of objections to the application of the county collector for

judgment for taxes previously paid under protest by the
railroad. This alternative had the great, if incidental, advantage of permitting a railroad to avoid the other available
remedy: a proceeding, under the Administrative Review Act,
challenging the multiplier certified to that county by the Department of Revenue. It is apparent that the latter type of
proceeding, in which the railroad would be seeking, in effect,

to increase the assessments on locally assessed property from
88 Id. at 71-72, 132 N.E.2d at 547-48.
89 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Dep't of Revenue, 17 Ill.2d. 376,

390-91, 161 N.E.2d 838, 847 (1959).
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50 per cent to 100 per cent of full, fair cash value, would
arouse intense local opposition. If the railroad were successful, not only would local property assessments double,
always a psychologically damning development, but the tax
ceilings imposed by state law on local governments, would,
in effect, likewise double, with a strong likelihood of a rise
in local government spending, and taxes.
Finally, the Callahancase narrowed the issue in the railroad
cases to a very simple, albeit enormously difficult, problem
of proof: how to demonstrate, by evidence satisfactory to a
court of law, a fact which was a matter of common knowledge, yet denied officially by all in authority - that locally
assessed property in Illinois was valued for tax purposes,
even after application of the multiplier certified by the De-

partment of Revenue, at but 50 to 55 per cent of its full, fair

cash valueY0 On this objective, the railroad litigants had
henceforth to center their efforts; and the success which they
were to achieve, in satisfying this evidentiary obligation, is
probably the single most significant aspect of the Railroad
Cases.
The "RailroadCases" - Main Phase
The first of the Railroad Cases so denominated was People
ex rel. Hillison V. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company.91 This case involved an appeal from an order of the county
court of Lee County sustaining the taxpayer railroad's objections
to property taxes and ordering a refund of 45 per cent of the taxes
paid by it under protest for the year 1958. The basis of the
90 See Tuttle v. Bell, 377 Ill.
510, 37 N.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 315 U.S.
815. (1941). In this case, some 158 individual farmers, in a suit brought
to enjoin the county treasurer from collecting a portion of the taxes levied
against their real estate, alleged that the assessed value of farm lands had
been fixed at 35 per cent of their fair cash value while city property had been
fixed at 25 per cent of such value. They attempted to show this by the reports of three different surveys, one made under the supervision of the State
Tax Commission, which relied on data obtained from studying eighty voluntary sales of farm lands and two hundred twenty-nine voluntary sales of
city property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the supreme
court affirmed. The court, in part, said:
If plaintiffs' grievance is directed at an over-assessed valuation from
which fraud is presumed, then they' have failed to plead the facts to
which such a presumption could be applied. The allegations in reference
to over-assessment of farm lands are based on the sale values of 80
tracts of farm lands but there is no allegation that any of plaintiffs'
lands formed a part of the 80 farms so considered, nor were any facts
pleaded to show a similarity between any of the farms sold and plaintiffs'
lands. On the other hand, if plaintiffs' claim rests upon the fact the
city property was valued at a lower percentage of its fair market value
than the farm lands, then the gist of their claims is that their land
should be relieved from a part of the taxes for the reason other real
estate was not assessed high enough. A court of equity will not grant
injunctive relief under such circumstances.
Id. at 514, 37 N.E.2d at 182.;
9122 Ill.2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961).
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objections was that the railroad's property was assessed by the
Department of Revenue at 100 per cent of full, fair cash value,
while locally assessed property, even after giving effect to the
multiplier certified by the Department of Revenue, was assessed
at no more than 55 per cent of full value, and that this action on
the part of the Department was deliberate and intentional,
thereby constituting constructive fraud.
In the course of the trial court proceedings, the taxpayer
railroad offered voluminous testimony and exhibits relating to
the assessment level of locally assessed property, after equalization. To prove the assessment and equalization of such property
at percentages below a 100 per cent valuation, the taxpayer railroad presented numerous exhibits consisting of various salesassessment and appraisal-assessment ratio studies, plus the
testimony of experts on assessment valuations and statistics.2
Some of these were Department of Revenue ratio studies. The
record showed that in preparing these studies, the Department
had made a comprehensive survey of voluntary, arms-length
sales of property and had compared the prices at which the
property was sold to the assessed valuation of the property, and
that the resulting ratios were then tabulated to determine median
ratios. In some counties separate median ratios were determined
for rural and urban property. Each such median was weighted
to represent the proportion of each class of property to all of the
property iriithe taxing district. The weighted ratios were then
averaged to get the weighted sales ratio for the county. The
supervisor of the property tax division also prepared a statewide average assessment ratio showing the relationship, in terms
of a percentage, of equalized assessed value to full value.
In addition, the United States Census Bureau study of the proportion of Illinois assessed values, as equalized, to full, fair cash values,
ascertained through sales prices during the first six months of 1956,
was introduced, and other comparisons of assessed values to appraised values, as of April 1, 1958, were submitted. . . . Sales ratio
studies and appraisal ratio studies of the assessment level in Lee
'County in 1958 were also introduced.92
On appeal, the supreme court sustained the finding of the
trial court that locally assessed property, even after giving effect
to the multiplier certified by the Department of Revenue, was
assessed at less than 55 per cent of full, fair cash value in 1958.
Said the court:
Defendant offered voluminous testimony and exhibits relating
to the assessment level of locally assessed property, after equalization. This consisted chiefly of studies of the assessment level of Illinois property made by the Department of Revenue each year inaccordance with the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended .... Unde' this
92 Id. at 97, 174 N.E.2d at 179.
93 Id. See Parham, Taxation of Property in Illinois,' 1961 U. ILL. L. F
645, 648-49.

Taxation of Real Propertyin Cook County

19681

mandate, the Department annually determines the percentage relationship for each county of the State between the valuations at
which locally assessed property, which includes all real estate except that owned by a railroad, is listed by assessors, and the estimated full, fair cash value of such property. This was done through
a comparison of the assessed values and full, fair cash values of
property shown to be the subject of bona fide sales, established
through an analysis of property transfers and other means ....
Each of these studies found that locally assessed property was
equalized by the county multipliers of the Department of Revenue
at less than 55% of full, fair cash value. The Department's studies
established a State-wide average ratio for local property for 1957
and eleven prior years. Because it was shown that total assessed
values increased only slightly in 1958 over 1957, no substantial
change in the 1958 assessment level could have occurred....
Studies of the type introduced in this case to determine the general assessment level of Illinois property, carried out by the Department of Revenue pursuant to statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 120,
par. 627), have been recognized by this court. ....
Plaintiff offered no evidence to contradict any of these studies
or the other evidence presented by defendant showing the assessment level. The trial court made a finding of fact that locally assessed property, both in Lee County and in the State generally, was
assessed at less than 55% of full, fair cash value in 1958. With uncontradicted evidence
supporting this finding, it will not be dis94
turbed on appeal.

In the supreme court, the county collector relied heavily upon
an attack on the jurisdiction of the trial court. He contended
that the objections of the taxpayer railroad necessarily required
the trial court to review the Department of Revenue's determination of the county multipliers and that the exclusive remedy
by which this might be done was by the filing of a petition-with
the Department seeking revision of the multipliers as prescribed
in section 148a of the Revenue Act, with judicial review of such
administrative decision in the manner provided in section 138
and in the Administrative Review Act.
The supreme court, however, held that the county court had

jurisdiction. 95

In so holding, the court relied, in part, upon its

94 People ez rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 22 Ill.2d
88, 96-98, 174 N.E.2d 175, 179 (1961).
95 Section 148a, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §629a (1965), provides that
within thirty days after the county clerk receives from the Department of
Revenue its estimate of the full, fair cash value of locally assessed property
in the county, any taxing district or taxpayer, claiming to be detrimentally
affected thereby, may petition the Department for a reconsideration of such
estimate and upon such reconsideration, after hearing, the Department can
confirm or revise the estimate. Section 138, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §619
(1965), gives the circuit court of the county in which the property is assessed,
or in which some part of such property is situated, the power to review
all final administrative decisions of the Department in administering the
provisions of the Revenue Act. By amendment of this section in 1947, the
review procedure is governed by the Administrative Review Act. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, §§264-279 (1965). In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the supreme court concluded that the provisions for administrative
review under section 138, as amended in 1947, were meant to be applicable
to original assessments made by the Department of Revenue, and that the
subsequent enactment of Section 148a did not evidence a legislative intent
to make the procedure thereunder an exclusive remedy.
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earlier rulings, or dicta, in the Burlington and Callahan cases,
wherein the court had stated that the tax objection procedure
was available to the railroads as a remedy under circumstances
of constructive 9 fraud resulting from debasement of locally assessed property.
The county collector also relied, in the supreme court, upon
a fairly intricate argument to the effect that the Department
had, in fact, assessed the Illinois property of the taxpayer railroad at substantially less than its full, fair cash value.

7

On this

issue, too, the supreme court ruled against the collector.
The trial court had ordered a refund of 45 per cent of the
taxes paid under protest by the taxpayer railroad. The practical
effect of this order was to reduce the assessment of the railroad's
property to 55 per cent of its full, fair cash value. However, the
supreme court had previously ruled in the Burlington case, that
the Butler Bills forbade such equalization of assessments at less
than 100 per cent of actual value. The court ruled that the
proper measure of recovery for the taxpayer railroad was the
96 The judicial remedies available to a taxpayer railroad might be summarized as follows:
1. In the event of overassessment of the railroad's property by the Department of Revenue (assessment by the'Department of the property at more
than 100 per cent of its actual value), the railroad might bring a proceeding, pursuant to the Administrative Review Act, to review the Department's assessment.
2. In the event of underassessment, even after application of the multiplier
certified by the Department, of locally assessed property (such property
being assessed at a lesser percentage of its actual value than the percentage at which the railroad's property is assessed, whether the railroad's
property be assessed at 100 per cent of its actual value, or at some lesser
percentage), the railroad would have a choice of remedies:
a. A proceeding, pursuant to the Administrative Review Act, to review
the multiplier certified to a given county, to the end that the multiplier
finally certified would be sufficiently great that the locally assessed
property would be assessed at the same percentage of actual value as
was the railroad's property.
b. A proceeding, by way of objections to the application of the county
collector for a judgment for taxes levied against the railroad and paid
under protest, alleging the illegally disproportionate assessment and
taxation of the railroad's property in such county by reason of such
underassessment of locally assessed property.
97 The burden of proof was on the railroad taxpayer, in each of the
Railroad Cases, to demonstrate that its property was assessed at a substantially greater percentage of its actual value than was locally assessed property. If the railroad were able to assume, as a starting point, that its property was assessed at 100 per cent of actual value - then the railroad's task
was considerably simplified; it need prove only the lesser percentage applied
in the case of locally assessed property. On the other hand, if the railroad's
property were assessed at some percentage of actual value other than 100
per cent, the railroad would have to prove both the percentage employed in
the assessment of its own property, and the percentage used in the case of
locally assessed property. For this reason, the several railroad taxpayers
invoked, the presumption that the Department of Revenue had performed
its statutory duty, and had assessed the property of the railroad taxpayer
in question at 100 per cent of its actual value; the local authorities, on the
other hand, repeatedly sought, on varying grounds,: to demonstrate that the
railroad's property had been assessed at some other, lesser percentage of
.
its actual value.
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difference between the local taxes in fact levied against it, and
the taxes which would have been levied against it had locally
assessed property been valued, for tax purposes, at 100 per cent
of full, fair cash value. Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case with directions to recompute the exact amount
of the refund due the taxpayer railroad. As a practical matter,
it is understood that the recovery, so redetermined, differed but
slightly from the trial court's initial award.
The second Railroad Case was a consolidation, for hearing,
of two causes: People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio
Railroad Company and People ex rel. Kohorst v. Chicago and
North Western Railway Company."8 In these cases, the county collector of Sangamon County had filed applications for judgment in
the county court against the taxpayer railroads for 1957 taxes
paid under protest. The railroads in each of these cases filed substantially similar objections, and appealed from orders overruling
them.
These objections were based upon the contention that the
property in Illinois of the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company, and of the Chicago and North Western Railway Company,
as distributed to Sangamon County and its taxing districts by
the Department of Revenue, was assessed and equalized at full,
fair cash value, while locally assessed property in the county and
its taxing districts was assessed and equalized at levels which did
not exceed 50 per cent and 38.50 per cent, respectively, of such
value. The objections further asserted that the officials charged
with assessment and equalization functions willfully and deliberately assessed local property at the lower levels, and that the officials' misconduct in this regard resulted in gross discrimination
against the railroads and was constructively fraudulent. The
measure of recovery sought was the difference between what the
two railroads were in fact taxed and what they should have been
taxed had locally assessed property been assessed and equalized
at its full, fair cash value.
As in the Hillison case, the evidence adduced in the trial
court, by the railroads, with regard to the assessment of locally
assessed property, was quite extensive:
The evidence of the ratio of locally assessed property to full,
fair cash value consisted of exhibits, sales-assessment ratio studies,
appraisals and appraisal studies, a survey by the Sangamon County
board of review, and the testimony of experts.
The Department of Revenue determines the ratio of assessments of locally assessed property to full, fair cash value. The assessed value is obtained from abstracts of the assessment books by
each county clerk after such books have been certified by the boards
of review. Full value is obtained from edited samples of actual sales
98 22 Ill.2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182 (1961).
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in each county. These samples have been secured and edited in the
same manner for each year since 1951. The Department considers
the sales ratios for the first three years of the four-year period next
preceding the subject year, since ratio studies of those three years
will have been completed. The ratio of assessed to full value is first
determined in each transaction, and the ratios for all eligible transactions are tabulated to determine median ratios. Separate medians
in Sangamon County are determined for rural and urban property,
and such median ratios are weighted to represent the proportions
which each class of property is of all the property in the taxing district for which the ratio is being determined, and finally the
weighted ratios are then averaged to determine the average
weighted sales ratio for the county.
... Dr. Rolf A. Weil, Dean of the College of Administration of
Roosevelt University expressed the opinion that the foregoing
method was accurate and substantially that recommended by the National Association of Tax Administrators ....
Dr. Frederick A. Ekeblad of Northwestern University testified
that in his opinion the procedure followed by the Department of
Revenue is well known and accepted, and affords a statistical basis
for arriving at the ratio of assessment to full value with a minimum
number of sample sales ...
H. Clyde Reeves, former Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue,
gave an opinion that there were adequate samples to assure accuracy
in the method used by the Department and agreed with the conclusions reached by Maynard, Dr. Ekeblad, and Dr. Weil.
There was much more evidence of other tests, studies and criteria bearing upon the value placed on locally assessed property
which substantiates the evidence of its valuation at just under 50%.
We see no purpose, however, in further comment, since it would
merely be cumulative.99
The supreme court, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, reversed and remanded with directions to order refunds to the
taxpayer railroads. 10 0
In the Koho rst case, as in the Hillison case, the county collector relied heavily on the jurisdictional argument that the sole
remedy of the taxpayer railroads was by direct judicial review,
under the Administrative Review Act, of the Department of
Revenue's orders certifying multipliers for the several counties
in which they owned property, and that the county court had no

jurisdiction to consider their objections upon the application of
the county collector for judgment for taxes paid under protest.
As in the Hillison case, this contention was rejected by the court.
The Kohorst case also raised the question whether the state,

county, or township ratio of underassessment was to be applied
in determining the amount of refunds to which railroads were
entitled. The court ruled in favor of using the county ratio of
underassessment for this purpose. In brief, the recovery of the

railroad taxpayers was calculated as if the Department of Revenue had done what the Revenue Act enjoined it to do:

certified a

multiplier to the county as a unit sufficiently great that property
99 Id. at 109-11 174 N.E.2d at 186.
100 Id. at 11 2 -19, 174 N.E.2d at 187.
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locally assessed would have been valued, for tax purposes, at 100
per cent of its full, fair cash value.10 '
The next of the Railroad Cases was People ex rel. Dallas V.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RailroadCompany 0 2 This involved
an appeal from the county court of Johnson County. The county
collector had filed applications for judgment against the taxpayer
railroad for 1958, 1959 and 1960 taxes paid under protest. The
objections of the railroad taxpayer were stricken on motion of
the collector, and judgment entered in his favor. The railroad
taxpayer appealed to the supreme court.
The railroad's objections were based upon the contention that
its property was assessed by the Department of Revenue at its
full, fair cash value, while locally assessed property was assessed
and equalized at levels of less than 55 per cent of full, fair cash
value. The undervaluation of locally assessed properties resulted
in a lower tax base and hence a higher tax rate than would otherwise be the case, causing a disproportionately large amount of
tax to be borne by the railroad's property. This discrimination
was so gross as to be constructively fraudulent.
The county collector relied on the court's decision in the
Callahan case, contending that the objections of the taxpayer
railroad alleged insufficient facts upon which to base a case of
constructive fraud. The supreme court rejected this contention
in an opinion which reflected how much the railroads had learned
from the Callahan case, as to what they must be prepared to allege, and prove, in such a case:
We do not think a contrary conclusion is called for by People
ex rel. Callahanv. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio RailroadCo.... upon which
the collector relies. In that case we affirmed an order striking objections of the-present nature where they merely alleged generally
that locally assessed property was intentionally undervalued, and
where the figure alleged to be the full value of locally assessed property was unsupported by any alleged factual basis. In the case at bar
we are not confined to bare allegations of value. Not only are figures given but it is alleged that from records within the Department's official files it could be seen that local properties were being
assessed at small percentages of their full fair cash value, and that
the Department knew or should have known therefrom that the multiplier used was insufficient to raise the assessed value even to 50%
of full value. It is apparent that the stated figures are based not
upon conjecture, or upon mere computations from an assumed undervaluation percentage, but upon records and studies in the official files
of the Department of Revenue. The Callahan case is not controlling.103

The supreme court reversed the county court, and remanded the
cases with directions to overrule the motions to strike.
The ffourth so-called railroad case was People ex rel Wenzel
101 Id. at 112-15, 174 N.E.2d at 187-88.
10226 Ill.2d 292, 186 N.E.2d 335 (1962).
108 Id. at 295-96, 186 N.E.2d at 337-38.
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V. Chicago and North Western Railway Company,104 which involved an appeal from the county court of Macoupin County. The
county collector had filed applications for judgment for the taxes
which the taxpayer railroad had paid under protest for the years
1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959. From orders overruling its objections
to such taxes the taxpayer railroad appealed to the supreme court.
With respect to each year of assessment the objections alleged that the railroad's property in Macoupin County had been
assessed at full, fair cash value by the Department of Revenue,
but that locally assessed property, even after giving effect to the
multiplier certified by the Department, had been assessed at no
more than 42.70 per cent of full, fair cash value, for the years
1956, 1957 and 1958, and at no more than 55 per cent for the
year 1959. The objections also alleged that the underassessment
of the locally assessed property was deliberate on the part of the
state and local officials concerned, that it was constructively fraudulent, and that the undervaluation of locally assessed property
resulted in excessive, illegal and discriminatory taxes on the
railroad's property.
At the hearing on its objections, the evidence tendered by
the taxpayer railroad followed the course established by the taxpayers in the Hillison and Kohorst cases. The taxpayer railroad
sought to introduce into evidence studies of the Department of
Revenue relating to the assessment level of Illinois property in
general, and to the ratio between full value and assessed value in
particular. These ratio studies disclosed that Macoupin County
assessments, both before and after application of the multiplier
certified by the Department of Revenue, were for considerably
less than the full, fair cash value in each of the years in question.
As had been done in the Kohorst case, the taxpayer railroad
sought to introduce testimony explaining the ratio studies and
expressing opinions as to their reliability. The county collector,
in turn, introduced testimony reflecting upon the reliability of
the ratio studies, and evidence designed to show that the studies
had not been based upon a truly representative sampling of real
estate transactions in the county.
The trial court ruled that the ratio studies for the years 1956
and 1957 were not admissible in evidence, because data cards
upon which such studies had been based had been destroyed by
the Department of Revenue. The trial court then overruled the
taxpayer's objections for those years. As to the years 1958 and
1959, the trial court ruled that the ratio study evidence was admissible. The trial court, nonetheless, overruled the tax objections with an express finding that the taxpayer's evidence did
not establish that local real property was assessed at a figure
104

28 Ill.2d 205, 190 N.E.2d at 780 (1963).
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less than 100 per cent of fair cash value. From the trial court's
orders overruling its tax objections for the years 1956, 1957,
1958 and 1959, the taxpayer railroad appealed.
The supreme court reversed and remanded with directions
to sustain the taxpayer's objections, and to determine the amount
of the refund to which it was entitled for each of the years. The
court's ruling as to the years 1956 and 1957 dealt, primarily, with
various hearsay objections. The ratio studies for those years
were based on data cards showing the sales price and assessment
detail for particular transactions. The cards had been destroyed
by the Department of Revenue before the trial. The court, relying heavily upon the status of the ratio studies as official records
made and compiled each year pursuant to statutory mandate,
ruled against the hearsay objections, and held the 1956 and 1957
studies to be competent evidence. 10
The court went on to consider the issues raised by the taxpayer's objections to the 1958 and 1959 taxes. The court's comments
as to these years also applied, of course, to the years 1956 and
1957 once the taxpayer railroad's evidence as to those years was
held admissible. 10 6 The court stated:
There remains for consideration the issue raised by the denial
of defendant's objections to the 1958 and 1959 taxes, viz., whether
the sales-assessment method of determining the ratio between full
and assessed value is a reliable and competent method. The testimony on this issue is detailed and voluminous, defendant's evidence
and witnesses being almost repetitious of what was presented in
People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio RailroadCo. .. . and
we see no beneficial purpose in setting it forth in full. Suffice it to
say that witnesses for defendant, who had wide experience in the
fields of economics, taxation and statistical studies, testified that the
sales-assessment method of determining ratio is a reliable, economical and easily administered method which is widely recognized and
and private agencies. An econoemployed by various State, Federal
mist testifying for plaintiff, 0 7 on the other hand, admitted that the
sales-assessment method was one of two primary methods of determining ratio, but expressed his preference for the method where full
value of the property is determined by appraisal. However, the witness had no experience in making such a study, had no idea as to the
cost or practicability of the appraisal method, and conceded that the
principal disadvantage of the latter method was the human errors of
judgment in making appraisals. At the same time, he agreed that
the sales-assessment method, being based upon actual sales had the
advantage of objectivity, and that there is probably no better criterion of actual value than what a piece of property will sell for in a
market between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
We cannot say that the plaintiff's proof so detracts from the
reliability of the ratio studies that they should not be accorded the
105 Id. at 209-14, 190 N.E.2d at 782-85.
106 Id. at 214-16, 190 N.E.2d at 785-86.
107 Dr. H. K. Allen, who also testified in People ex rel. Enrietta v. Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R.R., 29 Il.2d 605, 610, 195 N.E.2d 170, 174 (1964). See text
at notes 109-11 infra.
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same probative value they were given in the Hillison and Kohorst
cases. At best the evidence shows two accepted methods by which
the ratio between full and assessed value may be determined, each
with its advantages and each with its disadvantages, and it is the
decided weight of the evidence in this record that the sales-assessment method is the most widely accepted and used. Our statute requires only that the Department use such means as it deems 'proper
and reasonable' to make its studies on assessed valuations, and a
mere difference in opinion as to what is the best or most reasonable
method is not sufficient to bring the matter within the range of judicial review. (Cf. Schreiber v. County of Cook,. .. ) on the record
here, we find that the studies were reliable and competent evidence
of the ratio between full and assessed value, and that, based upon
the studies for the years in question, the court's findings that defendant failed to prove that local real property was assessed at less
than 100% of fair cash market value are against the manifest
weight of evidence. 10 8
The next of the Railroad Cases was People ex rel. EnriettaV.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company,10 9 which involved an

appeal from the county court of Grundy County. The county collector made application for judgment for the 1959 taxes which the
taxpayer had paid under protest. The taxpayer railroad filed ob-

jections. Among these objections was No. 12, in which the taxpayer alleged that while its property in the county was assessed
at full value, the county level of locally assessed property did not
exceed 41.5 per cent and the equalized assessment did not exceed
50 per cent of full, fair cash value. Assessment of local property
108 People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 28 Ill.2d 205,
215-16, 190 N.E.2d 780, 785-86 (1963):
Testifying more directly to the employment of the sales-assessment
method in these cases, plaintiff's witness stated that he could have no
confidence in a sales ratio study in which property is classified only as
urban and rural, and stated that, in his opinion, every such study should
be based upon a classified universe, (that is a classification of every piece
of property in the county as to its use and location,) from which samples representing every class of property would be taken, and the sample properties then appraised. On rebuttal, however, equally experienced witnesses for defendant testified that the classifications insisted
upon by plaintiff's witness were of no consequence or usefulness unless
the assessors and boards of review maintained similar classifications,
which they did not, and that, even then, such a classification was of no
significance if the same level of assessment, or percentage of full value,
was maintained in the assessment of all classes of property. The same
witnesses pointed out that the appraisal method of determining ratio
was a costly, time-consuming method which is little used, and testified
that the classification of property in Macoupin County on a rural and
urban basis was all that was practical and of any use.
To further support the claimed unreliability of the sales-assessment
method plaintiff introduced into evidence exhibits listing some 243 transactions selected from the land records of Macoupin County wherein, for
the most part, the sales values reflected by the deeds were apparently
lower than the assessed valuation. Such evidence, however, was thoroughly discredited. Less than 17 of the transactions met the criteria
followed by the Department in its effort to consider only transactions
where there was a willing seller and a willing buyer. Further, witnesses
for defendant testified without contradiction on rebuttal, that even if the
transactions selected by plaintiff were added to the samples considered
by the Department in making its studies, the ratios between assessed and
full value for the years in question would not be significantly different.
109 29 I1l.2d 605, 195 N.E.2d 174 (1964).
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was therefore so grossly discriminatory as to be constructively
fraudulent.
At the trial, the county collector presented evidence which
he asserted established that the taxpayer's assessed value was
only about 80 per cent of its full, fair cash market value, and
that the sales ratio studies used to arrive at the percentage values
of locally assessed property produced an inept result. The trial
court overruled taxpayer's objection No. 12, and the taxpayer appealed. The supreme court reversed, and remanded with directions to sustain objection No. 12, and to order a refund to the
taxpayer.
With regard to the valuation to be placed upon the taxpayer
railroad's property in Illinois, the supreme court ruled that the
county collector had failed to overcome the presumption that the
Department of Revenue had complied with the statutory mandate, and had assessed such property at its full, fair cash value. 110
As to the county collector's attack upon the taxpayer's evidence regarding the sales-assessment ratio studies of locally assessed property, the court said:
Just as there is a presumption that the Department complied
with the statute in fixing the railroad's valuation, a like presumption obtains that there was compliance by the officials charged with
locally assessing property. The sales-assessment ratio studies for
locally assessed property prepared by the Department of Revenue
for the years 1951 to 1959, inclusive, were introduced in evidence.
They show a fairly steady decline. In 1959 the weighted ratio was
37.52 % and after application of the equalization factor (multiplier)
it was 45.20% of full, fair cash value. The method of arriving at
the result disclosed by such studies has been fully explained in the
Hillison, Kohorst and Wenzel cases and need not be repeated. E. L.
Maynard, supervisor of the property tax division of the Department
of Revenue, testifying under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act,
said that the procedures used are the same as those in other downstate counties and the same as those used for a number of years. He
further stated that there were no significant changes in the level of
market values in Grundy County. These ratio studies were sufficient to overcome the presumption that locally assessed property was
at full, fair cash value.
The collector asserts that the sales-assessment method used by
Id. at 607-09, 195 N.E.2d at 175-77:
The Department of Revenue of the state of Illinois has the duty of
determining the fair cash value of railroad property. When the assessment has been made and certified, as here, there is a presumption that
the Department complied with the statutory mandate, and that the assessment is the full, fair cash value. This presumption finds support in
official reports of the Department of Revenue and its predecessor, the
Tax Commission, certificates, and expert testimony.
The Department has chosen a method to carry out the statutory
110

mandate and has used it for many years. That method has received the
tacit approval of this Court in a number of cases. This attack by the
collector upon the method of valuation used by the Department charged
with that duty by the State falls short of overcoming the presumption.
We are of the opinion that the record bears out the Department's valuation as being the full, fair cash value of the objector's Illinois property.
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the Department is unreliable. The proof offered on this subject was
very similar to that adduced in the Wenzel case. . . . What was said
in People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co.
...is appropriate here. 'We cannot say that the plaintiff's proof
so detracts from the reliability of the ratio studies that they should
not be accorded the same probative value they were given in the
Hillison and Kohorst cases.' The assessment-sales ratio studies
were admissible and establish the ratio between the full, fair cash
value and the assessed value."'
The sixth of the Railroad Cases was People ex rel. Korzen v.
Chicago, Burlington& Quincy RailroadCompany,112 which was an
appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. The county collector made application for a judgment for taxes paid under protest
by the taxpayer for the year 1957. The taxpayer railroad filed an
objection charging gross discrimination and constructive fraud in
that, while its property in Cook County was assessed at full, fair
cash value, locally assessed property was assessed at a level no
higher than 50 per cent of full, fair cash value. The trial court
overruled the objection, and the taxpayer appealed.
The trial court had found that locally assessed property in
Cook County was assessed at a level no higher than 50 per cent of
its full, fair cash value, that the Department of Revenue had not
assessed the railroad's property at full value and that the railroad therefore had failed to prove discrimination and constructive fraud.
No appeal was taken from that portion of the trial court's
order finding undervaluation of locally assessed property. Accordingly, the sole issue on appeal was whether the proof adduced by the county collector was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the Department of Revenue had complied with
the statute and assessed the taxpayer railroad's property at full
value. The theory of the county collector was that evidence of
sales of other railroads between 1947 and 1961 demonstrated
that the assessments by the Department of Revenue were far
lower than full value, and that, therefore, there was no evidence
to sustain the taxpayer's contention that its property had been
assessed at full value. The only testimony offered by the county
collector at the trial was that of two witnesses who prepared
graphs and identified exhibits, and that of the Director of Revenue who defined salvage value and answered several hypothetical
questions on cross-examination. The exhibits introduced by the
county collector related to twelve sales of Illinois railroad property during the years 1947 to 1961.
The supreme court concluded that the collector had adduced
no competent evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of
the department's assessment and therefore reversed and re111 Id. at 609-10, 195 N.E.2d at 177.
112

32 IlM.2d 554, 209 N.E.2d 649 (1965).
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manded with directions to order a refund computed in accordance with the Kohorst and Hillisoncases. 113
In the course of its opinion, the court took occasion to summarize, as follows, the propositions of substantive law established by the first five Railroad Cases:
It is now settled that where a railroad's assessment is at full
value and locally assessed property is so undervalued as to result in
gross discrimination against the railroad, the assessment is constructively fraudulent ....
As stated in Hillison and Kahorst, the
measure of recovery in such case is the difference between the
amount of taxes extended against a railroad and the amount which
would have been extended had the locally1 14
assessed property (at the
county level) been equalized at full value.
In connection with the Korzen case, another decision, of
similar designation, decided recently, should also be noted: Peo11 5

ple ex rel. Korzen v. The Belt Railway Company of Chicago.
This was also an appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
The county collector made application for judgment for taxes paid
under protest by the taxpayer railroad for the years 1959 through
1962. The taxpayer filed objections charging that discrimination
in assessment values between its properties and locally assessed
property were so gross as to be constructively fraudulent. As in
the first Korzen case, there was no dispute that locally assessed
property was assessed at no more than 50 per cent of its full,
fair cash value; and, as in the first Korzen case, the disputed
questions centered on the county collector's contention that the
taxpayer's property had not been assessed by the Department of
Revenue at full value. The instant case differed from the first
Korzen case in that there had been, during one of the years in
question, a sale of the properties of the taxpayer. The collector
maintained that this "contemporary sale," which was for a sum
substantially in excess of the assessed value, established his con-

tention that the Department had not assessed the property of the
taxpayer at full value.
Notwithstanding this sale, which had been made in 1962,
the trial court entered judgment for the taxpayer railroad, and
the supreme court affirmed. The court, however, in rendering its
decision, was divided, two justices dissenting and one not participating.
The last of the Railroad Cases was People ex rel. Musso v.
Chicago, Burlington& Quincy Railroad Company116 This case was
a consolidation, for hearing, of some forty-six appeals from the
Circuit Court of Madison County. The county collector had made

application for judgment for taxes paid under protest by twelve
113 Id. at 564-65, 209 N.E.2d at 654-55.
114 Id. at 556, 209 N.E.2d at 650.
115 37 Ill.2d 158, 226 N.E.2d 265 (1967).
11833 Ill.2d 88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965).
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taxpayer railroads for the years 1957 to 1962, inclusive. The
taxpayer railroads filed objections contending that their property
was assessed at full value while the equalized value, for tax purposes, of locally assessed property did not exceed 55 per cent of
full, fair cash value in any of the years involved, and that the resulting discrimination against them was so gross as to be constructively fraudulent.
The trial court found that locally assessed property, after
application of the multiplier certified by the Department of Revenue, had been assessed at from 48.14 per cent to 51.40 per cent
of full, fair cash value, that the properties of the railroad taxpayers were likewise underassessed at from 58 to 85 per cent
of full value, and that the disparities were so great as to constitute gross discrimination against the taxpayer railroads. The
refunds ordered by the trial court were not in dollar amounts but
in percentages, and the parties were to make the computations.
The measure of refund was the difference between the railroads'
taxes and the taxes they would have paid if all property in the
county had been assessed at full value. The amount of each such
refund was limited by (a) the amount of the protest, and (b)
the amount of any other refunds.
From these findings, the taxpayer railroads appealed, while
the county collector neither appealed, nor cross-appealed. Accordingly, as in the first Korzen case, there was no dispute on
appeal as to whether locally assessed property had been valued,
for tax purposes, at substantially less than its full value. The
only issue before the supreme court was whether the railroads'
properties had been assessed at full, fair cash value for the years
in question. The supreme court reversed, and remanded with
directions to order refunds in conformity with the method outlined in the Hiltison and Kohorst cases.
Two aspects of the Railroad Cases are of particular interest.
One is the collapse of the position taken initially by the taxing
authorities with regard to the prevailing level of assessment for
locally assessed property. In Hillison, Kohorst, and Wenzel, the
several county collectors vigorously disputed the contention of
the taxpayer railroads that locally assessed property had been
valued, for tax purposes, at substantially less than its full, fair
cash value. Next, the Enrietta case reflected a substantial shift
in position. The county authorities continued to challenge the
evidence by which the taxpayer sought to establish that locally
assessed property, even after application of the multiplier certified by the Department of Revenue, was assessed at 50 per cent
or less of its actual value. On the other hand, the authorities
also contended alternatively that the property of the taxpayer
railroad was itself assessed at less than its full value. Finally,
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in Korzen and Musso, the taxing districts abandoned completely
their initial legal position. No longer did they deny that locally
assessed property was valued at substantially less than full value
for tax purposes. Instead, their sole contention on appeal was
that the Department had failed to value the property of the taxpayer railroads at 100 per cent of its actual value.
It was noted previously that the Callahan decision had left
the railroad industry with what appeared to be an almost insuperable burden of proof, i.e. to establish to the satisfaction of
the courts, that locally assessed property was in fact assessed at
but one-half of its actual value. At the conclusion of these cases,
the railroads of the state had succeeded so well in this task that
the proposition was no longer even contested by the local taxing
authorities.
The other aspect of the Railroad Cases which is of particular
interest, concerns the proof by which the railroad taxpayers accomplished this result. In Hullison and Kohorst, the initial Railroad Cases, the taxpayers adduced rather diverse evidence to
demonstrate that the ratio between the assessed value of locally
assessed property and the full, fair cash value of such property,
fell considerably short of 100 per cent. In this connection, the
railroads relied not only upon the studies and data of the Department of Revenue, but also upon independent appraisal reports and material produced by the United States Bureau of
Census.
The Wenzel and Enrietta opinions indicate, however,
that
the railroad taxpayers were by then able to rely upon the salesassessment ratio studies of the Department of Revenue, supported by expert testimony regarding the general acceptability
and significance of such material. In this connection the following passage from the court's opinion in the first Korzen case is
of interest as an indication of the court's acceptance, for purposes of proof, of such statistical evidence:
Assuming, arguendo, that the data taken from Interstate Commerce Commission reports is admissible for any purpose, it cannot
be used as an assessment ratio study, as is done with locally assessed
property. The purpose of such a study is to establish a level as assessment, not the ratio of particular property not sold. It is a statistical technique of so sampling sales that a series of eligible transactions can provide a frequency distribution pattern which will provide a median representative of the level of assessment of a given
class of property. Some of the principal tests which must be met,
according to the experts, are grading property into comparable
classes, sufficient transactions to produce a weighted average that
will reflect accuracy, sales must be at arms length, condemnation
sales are eliminated and intercorporate transfers are left out. 117
In brief, it would appear that the assessments-sales ratio
studies of the Department of Revenue, duly supplemented by ex117 32 I1l.2d 554, 561-62, 209 N.E.2d 644, 653 (1965).
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pert testimony regarding their significance and reliability, as in
the Wenzel and Enrietta cases, are now determinative as to the
prevailing level of assessment in a given county for a given year.
As the court concluded in Enrietta, "the assessments-sales ratio
studies were admissible and establish the ratio between the full,
118
fair cash value and the assessed value."
The "Railroad Cases" -

Implications for Cook County

In considering the potential effect of the Railroad Cases upon
the taxation of real property in Cook County, it is necessary,
first, to distinguish between what those cases established, and
what they did not establish. Of the substantive legal propositions
established, or reestablished, by those decisions, the most important is easily overlooked - perhaps because it is so obvious.
The Railroad Cases reaffirmed, as to real property, the simple
and basic proposition that section 1 of the Revenue Article
means what it says: "[A] llproperty is to be taxed uniformly, in
proportion to its value." There is no little irony in the observation that able contemporary counsel for the Burlington and North
Western Railroads, after years of effort, accomplished no more,
in the Hillison, Wenzel, Korzen and Musso cases, with regard to
the respective tax burdens of railroad and other property, than
had their predecessors of a century ago. Thus, in Bureau County
v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company," 9 an 1867
case, the railroad had scheduled its property at the same proportion of its fair market value as was used in assessing property generally throughout the county. Nonetheless, the board of supervisors of the county increased the railroad's assessment by 40
per cent. In holding that such actions violated the constitutional
guaranty of uniformity of taxation and rendered the increase
in assessment void, the court said:
The question is before us in all its length and breadth: Can a railroad company, by any action of the corporate authorities of a county,
be required to pay more than its fair share of taxes as compared
with those paid by individuals? Does the power exist anywhere to
destroy the cardinal principle of uniformity of taxation so forcibly
and prominently insisted upon by the Constitution? This is a great
question, affecting, not only railroad corporations, but every property owner and taxpayer in the State.
It seems to us there is something so monstrous in the proposition as to be indefensible by fair argument.
Regarding uniformity as the vital principle, the dominant idea
of the Constitution, where can the power reside to produce its opposite? Where is the power lodged, in view of this principle, to
compel A to pay, on his land or personal property, of no more value
than the same kind of property belonging to B, forty per cent
more taxes than are assessed against B? We affirm such a power
nowhere exists, and if it did it would be so revolting in its exercise
118 29 Ill.2d 605, 610, 195 N.E.2d 174, 177 (1964).
119 44 Ill. 229 (1867).
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to the lowest sense of justice with which our species is imbued as
to justify any and every lawful expedient for relief against it.120
Another 1867 case, similarly reminiscent of the Railroad Cases of
the 1960's is Chicago & North Western Railway Company v.
2 1

Boone County.

Moreover, the supreme court, in reaffirming and applying
the uniformity requirement of the Revenue Article, confounded
a good deal of skeptical opinion. There is little question but that
the railroads of the state had long borne an unduly large share
of the local tax burden, and that such disproportionate taxation
of railroad property had become something of a "way of life" for
numerous counties and other taxing districts. The application
of the principles of the Railroad Cases compelled painful fiscal
readjustments for many such districts, and their "local" or resident, taxpayers. 12 2 In addition, the long drawn out litigation, by
"freezing" significant portions of the tax levies for successive
years, created budgetary problems for numerous other districts,
which were perhaps not otherwise greatly concerned about the
precise share of the local tax burden which might be borne by the
2 3
railroads.
Notwithstanding such practical, fiscal inconveniences resulting from its decisions, the court persevered, over a period of several years, in the application of the propositions established by
the first two of the Railroad Cases - Hillison and Kohorst. Conversely, however, it might be noted that the Railroad Cases, as
they evolved, under the court's procedural guidance, entailed no
spectacular decisions by the court. They entailed, instead, a
great mass of complex and prolonged litigation. There were no
less than seven Railroad Cases decided by the court. One of these,
Musso, was itself a consolidation, for hearing, of appeals in some
forty-six separate lawsuits and, as with other of the Railroad
Cases, there were a substantial number of additional lawsuits
120

Id. at 238.

1-144 Ill. 240 (1867).

See Parham, Taxation of Property in Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 645:
The strict enforcement of the present laws as contemplated by the
Court would accomplish the desired uniformity, but the political pressures which have brought about these discriminatory assessment practices will no doubt continue to thwart efforts to achieve this ideal. So
long as this stalemate exists, the taxes paid under protest continue to
mount and the taxing districts are harassed by financial uncertainty.
Id. at 651.
123 Chicago Sun-Times, July 24, 1965, at 36, col. 1:
Cook County Treasurer Bernard M. Korzen said Friday the County
had refunded the Burlington Route $324,989 in property taxes paid under
protest in 1957.
The payment was the first in an expected series of refunds to railroads that may total $40,000,000.
Korzen said the initial payment was made from a reserve fund of
$34,000,000 set aside to meet the claims.
Other local taxing bodies have kept in reserve railroad taxes paid
under protest since 1959.
122

252

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 1:212

which were, by agreement, dependent upon the outcome of the
case before the court. In brief, the supreme court proved itself
capable of fiscal revolution, provided it be accomplished in a
prosaic and legally becoming manner.
The Railroad Cases afford some basis, therefore, for the hope
that the supreme court might undermine, or render inoperative,
the Cook County system of de facto classification of real property
for purposes of taxation, notwithstanding the practical consequences of such action by the court. However, if Cook County's
de facto system is to be doomed by the court, it will probably,
like disproportionate taxation of railroad property, die a lingering judicial death.
In any event, the supreme court has taken care to demonstrate that the propositions of law established, and the relief
granted to the taxpayers in the Railroad Cases, are not peculiar
to an industry but extend to taxpayers generally. Thus, in People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Company, 2 4 the supreme court said:
We are also unconvinced by the taxpayer's argument that the
ordinary taxpayer is discriminated against in favor of railroads.
While review of the Department of Revenue's administrative assessment of railroad property is subject to the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, . . . the scope of the inquiry available to
the railroad is no greater than that available to other taxpayers in
a hearing on objections. In both situations we believe that the taxpayer is limited to a judicial inquiry as125
to whether the assessment is
actually or constructively fraudulent.
In People ex rel. County Collector of St. Clare County v. American.RefrigeratorTransit Company,26 the court followed the Hillison and Kohorst cases in directing the computation of the refund
to which a taxpayer, aggrieved by a constructively fraudulent
overassessment of its property, was entitled.
In the American Refrigeratorcase the court also drastically
lowered the degree of overassessment necessary to warrant an
inference of constructive fraud. It had been generally assumed,
prior to the Railroad Cases, that to constitute proof of constructive fraud, an overassessment would have to be from three to
four times as great, in proportion to the value of the property assessed, as the prevailing level of assessment. Thus, in Cook
County, where the prevailing level of assessment is about 50 per
cent, it would be necessary for property to be assessed at from
150 to 200 per cent of its actual value before the owner would be
able, solely on the basis of such assessment, to obtain judicial
relief. Certain language in the first three Railroad Cases indicated that this requirement might have been lowered to about
I11.2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966).
125 Id. at 376-77, 215. N.E.2d at 235.

12434

12633 Ill.2d 501, 211 N.E.2d 694 (1965).
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80 per cent. 127 The court, in the American Refrigerator case,
held, as a matter of law, that an overassessment of 78 per cent
or more constitutes constructive fraud.12 8 Thus, for example, if
the prevailing level of assessment is 50 per cent, any assessment
in excess of 89 per cent of actual value is vulnerable to judicial
12 9
attack, on the ground of constructive fraud.
However it is doubtful whether the "spread" under the Cook
County system of classification is sufficiently great, as between
the prevailing level of assessment for real property generally,
and the percentage of actual value used in the assessment of the
higher taxed classes of real property, to permit a trial court to
invoke very often the percentage test for constructive fraud, as
established by the American Refrigeratorcase.
And in the S.B.A. case, which involved a difference of approximately 25 per cent between the assessor's valuation of certain property, and the value placed upon it by the taxpayer's appraiser, the court specifically declined to establish a precise,
mathematical definition of constructive fraud:
The taxpayer urges this court to define the concept of constructive fraud on the basis of a grossly excessive assessment. Unfortunately this concept, as other legal concepts, is not susceptible to
precise definition. Our system of jurisprudence requires that these
inexact criteria be dealt with on a case-to-case basis. It is fundamental, however, that it is not the function of the judiciary to act
as a super board of review, but only to protect the public from
fraudulent discriminatory taxation and clear abuse of administrative authority. We can only say that the record in this case, showing no discrimination or failure to honestly perform administrative
127 People ex rel. Dallas v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 26 Ill.
2d 292, 186 N.E.2d 335 (1962). The court said:
We have recently held that an undervaluation may be so gross as
to indicate it was not honestly made but was known to be deficient,
and where it appears that the Department assesses a railroad's property
at 100% of its full value, the assignment of a multiplier to the county
which results in the assessment of other property at 55 per cent or less
of full value amounts to a constructively fraudulent discrimination.
(People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co., 22 Ill.2d
104; People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Co., 22 Ill.2d 88.) [100% - 55% = 45%; 45%/55% = 81.8%].
Id. at 293-94, 186 N.E. at 336.
128 33 Ill.2d 501, 504-05, 211 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1965).
Appellant also argues that the judgment must be reversed since
there was no finding of fraud in 'any shape, form or fashion.' It is clear
that fraud, either actual or constructive, must be proved in order to
sustain the judgment. However, we do not think it necessary that there
be an express finding of fraud if the evidence supports such a conclusion.
Here, the evidence clearly shows that appellee's property, after application of the multiplier, was assessed at $158,500 and that its actual fair
market value was $161,000. Thus, appellee's property was assessed at
approximately 98 per cent of its full fair market value, while other
locally assessed property was assessed at only 55 per cent of full fair
market value. This, in our opinion, was tantamount to constructive
fraud and supports the trial court's judgment that appellee is entitled
to a refund. [98% - 55% = 43%; 43%/55% = 78.2%].
12950% x 78% = 39%; 50% + 39% = 89%.
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functions, does
not justify interference with the proper assessing
10
authorities. 3
The court thus reaffirmed its traditional rule of judicial self-restraint in the review of real property assessments. Specifically,
it reiterated the proposition that the courts are not to serve as
"super boards of review" nor are they to intervene solely to rectify a "mere difference of opinion as to value between the assessing officers and the court.'13 1 That is to say, the courts are
not to decide, or perhaps more accurately, to arbitrate, disputes
between experts as to the precise value of specific parcels of property.
In effect, the court has rejected an opportunity to attack de
facto classification by way of a step-by-step lowering of the percentage of overassessment that would constitute constructive
fraud as a matter of law. Such probably would have engulfed
the courts in a large number of cases, which cases would have
intermixed judicial review of the classification practice of the
county assessor with issues concerned solely with the correctness
of his valuation of individual parcels of property.
Instead, the court has intimated, in its decisions subsequent
to the Railroad Cases, that it prefers to review assessments on the
basis of a challenge which goes to the pattern, or system of assessment followed by responsible administrative officials, rather
than to consider an attack upon a specific assessment result
reached by those officials. 132 The most important legal development associated with the Railroad Cases involves what is technically a matter not of substantive, but of adjective, or procedural law, i.e., the pattern of evidence to be adduced by the railroad taxpayers and accepted by the court, to prove the prevailing
level of assessment of locally assessed property in a specific
county, for a given year.
In a sense, this development reflects a merger of modern
130 34 Ill.2d 373, 378, 215 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1966).
131 People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill.2d 209, 211, 221 N.E.
2d 650, 652 (1966).
132 People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill.2d 373, N.E.2d 233
(1966):
There is no evidence in this record of actual fraud or malfeasance,
nor is there evidence that the assessment was made in disregard of recognized elements of value, or in violation of any accepted standards or regulations. The most that can be said is that the record discloses an honest
difference of opinion between one appraiser and the assessing authorities.
This is made evident by the compromise judgment of the trial court.
Id. at 378, 215 N.E.2d at 236.
People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill.2d 209, 221 N.E.2d
650 (1966) :
Before the conduct of the taxing authorities will be considered constructive fraud, the evidence must clearly establish that the assessment
was made in ignorance of the value of the property, or on a judgment
not based upon readily ascertainable facts, or on a designedly excessive
basis.
Id. at 211, 221 N.E.2d at 652.
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statistical technique33 with the mass of information, regarding
real property assessments and transactions in the several counties of Illinois, which the Department of Revenue has accumulated
and processed during the last twenty years.
The Revenue Act, as amended by the Butler Bills of 1945,
has imposed upon the Department the duty of making all necessary studies of assessments and of property values as will enable
the Department to ascertain and determine annually, the percentage relationship, for each county, between the value at which
property has been assessed by the local authorities and the full,
fair cash value of such property. 34 The procedure followed by
the Department in determining this percentage each year for the
101 counties, other than Cook County, is set forth in the Kohorst
and Wenzel opinions of the court.13 5
The procedure followed by the Department for Cook County
is essentially the same, and entails the following steps. 136
1. The Department of Revenue procures copies of all deeds
recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Cook
County.
2. The Department then eliminates from consideration all
deeds which do not appear to have been the result of an
"arm's length" transaction, such as those between members of a family, or between parent and subsidiary corporations.
3. The Department then determines, on the basis of the
federal documentary stamps affixed to each deed, the
indicated actual consideration for the property transferred by such deed.
4. On the basis of such indicated actual consideration, the
Department then selects the following deeds for tabulation:
a. For the months of April and October, deeds where
the indicated actual consideration was $2,000, or
more.
b. For the ten months other than April and October,
deeds where the indicated actual consideration was
$20,000, or more.
The deeds so selected for tabulation will number, in any
133 See

NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION

OF

TAX

ADMINISTRATORS,

GUIDE

FOR

SALES ASSESSMENTS, RATIO STUDIES, 1-2, 20-28, 54-56 56-60 (1954).
134 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §627 (1965) ; see Anderson v. City of Park
Ridge, 396 Il. 235, 246 72 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (1947) ; Troupis, Full Fair

Value Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REV. 160, 169-80 (1949).
135 People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 22 Ill.2d 104, 10910, 174 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1961) ; People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North
Western Ry., 28 Ill.2d 205, 209-10, 190 N.E.2d 780, 782-83 (1963).
136 See Gale, Assessment and Collection of Taxes, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 192,
203-04; ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS 1965, 131-32, 134-35 (1967).
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given year, between 13,000 and 15,000.
5. The Department then ascertains, from the records of
the County Assessor of Cook County, the assessed value
of the property conveyed by each deed under consideration. Such assessed value, of course, would be the assessed value before application of the Department's multiplier.
6. The Department also ascertains, from the records of the
county assessor, the "class" in which such property has
been placed by the assessor for assessment purposes.
Under the present de facto system of classification of
real property for purposes of taxation, the county assessor has established some 37 classes of real property.
These 37 classes have been combined in turn, by the Department into 17 "class groups.' 187 The deeds selected
for tabulation are then divided among these "class
groups," in accordance with the class designation which
has been given by the county assessor to the property
conveyed.
7. The data so selected by the Department is then tabulated,
first by class groups, and then for the county as a whole,
to determine the prevailing level of assessment in Cook
County.
The Department's procedure for Cook County, and that followed by it for the other 101 counties, appear to differ solely in
the following respects:
1. For the 101 counties other than Cook County, the Department tabulates selected deeds on the basis that there are
two classes of real property in each county: rural real
estate and urban real estate. 88 The Department, in each
137 The more important of the 17 "class groups," so employed by the
Department of Revenue in its analysis of Cook County assessments and the
corresponding assessor's class or classes encompassed in each group are as
follows:
Group Type of Improvement
Cook County Assessor's Classification
I
Cottages and bungalows
8
II
Split levels, 1 and 2-story
modern residences, modern
row houses
34, 4, 7, 8, 9, 7, 8, 95, 96
III
Old style residences
5, 6, 10
IV
Old style 2-story, 2-flat and 4-flat
11
V
Modern apartments, not over 6-flat
12, 13, 14
VIII
Modern stores, offices and
apartment buildings
20, 21
XIV
Factories, warehouses, quonset
buildings, other industrial buildings
33, 93
XV
Department stores, large offices,
mercantile and loft buildings
and public garages
91
138 However, in the case of those downstate townships and municipalities where there are "sufficient usable transfers," separate township and
city sales-assessment ratios are also prepared. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS 1965, 132 (1967).
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of these counties, first ascertains separate sales-assessment ratios for urban and for rural property. A
weighted average of these two ratios is then computed,
which average is the prevailing level of assessment for
the county as a whole. The "weighting" of the average
reflects, of course, the respective aggregate values of ur39
ban and rural real property in such county.
2. For Cook County, the Department tabulates on the basis
of the 17 "class groups" referred to above. A separate
sales-assessment ratio is first determined for each class
group. A weighted averaging of these 17 ratios in turn
produces the prevailing level of assessment for Cook
County as a whole. There are also six other prevailing
levels of assessment for Cook County, one for each of
four assessment districts into which Cook County is
divided, one for the city of Chicago, and one for the
county townships (that is to say, the portion of Cook
County lying outside the city of Chicago) .140
Armed with the opinions of the supreme court in the Railroad Cases, particularly the Enrietta and Wenzel decisions, and
the materials now known to exist in the records of the Department of Revenue, a Cook County taxpayer, who considers himself aggrieved by the operation of the de facto system of classification, and who chooses to challenge the assessment of his property pursuant to that system, should be able to establish in a
court proceeding, the following:
1.

That the prevailing level of assessment in Cook County,
even after application of the multiplier certified by the
Department of Revenue, does not exceed 50 per cent of
the actual value of all real property. Indeed, in view of
the position taken by the county authorities in the Korzen
cases, it is very likely that they would not even contest
this proposition.

2. That for purposes of administering his office, the county
assessor has grouped real property into some 36 classes,
and that the Department of Revenue, for its own operations, has combined these classes into some 17 class
groups. It should also be possible to establish, for each
class and class group, the type or types of property included therein, and to ascertain the class and class group
'39 E.g., People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 28
Ill.2d 205, 210, 190 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1963); see ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS 1965, 132 (1967); Weil, Property
Tax Equalization in Illinois, 6 NAT'L TAx J. 157, 159 (1953).
140 ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT

1965, 131-32, 134-35 (1967).

OF REVENUE,

PROPERTY TAX

STATISTICS -
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to which the property of the objecting taxpayer was assigned.
3. That the prevailing level of assessment in Cook County
for each of the Department's class groups has been a
certain specific percentage of the actual value of real
property included in such groups. It should also be possible, similarly, to establish the prevailing level of assessment in Cook County for each of the assessor's
classes."'
4. That the prevailing levels of assessment for property included in several of the Department's class groups, and
in several of the assessor's classes including the class
group and class encompassing the property of the objecting taxpayers, exceed, by a very wide margin, the
prevailing level of assessment for Cook County real
property generally. In all likelihood, it could also be
shown that such disparity between the prevailing levels
of assessment for those classes and class groups, on the
one hand, and the prevailing level of assessment for real
property generally, on the other, had existed for each of
the last ten or fifteen years.
5. That the prevailing level of assessment for the class encompassing the property of the objecting taxpayer was
a certain specific percentage of the full, fair cash value
of property included in such class - which percentage,
it will be assumed, was substantially in excess of 50
per cent.
The above propositions, duly established for purposes of a
suit challenging a given tax assessment, would appear to constitute an adequate foundation for a finding of constructive fraud,
entitling the objecting taxpayer to judicial relief.
The court would find it difficult, indeed, to escape the inference that the assessor, in fixing excessive valuations for property
in the class or classes in question, had acted deliberately and intentionally. It is one thing to characterize a given overassessment, or even a group of overassessments, as a mere "honest error of judgment" on the part of the assessing officials. It is
quite a different matter to explain such overvaluations where
they extend to an entire class of property, and have been repeated
year after year, for a generation or more.
141 For recent years, the Department would have retained the data cards
from which it had prepared its ratio studies on a class group basis; these
cards would contain the information needed to make similar ratio studies
on an assessor's class basis. It is uncertain for earlier years, for which the
data cards are no longer available, whether the Department's records would
permit a breakdown of its class group ratio studies into ratio studies of the
compound assessor's classes.
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A leading case on point is Aldrich v. Harding142 There the
plaintiff had brought suit to enjoin the collection of taxes for
1927 on certain real estate in Cook County. Involved was a primitive version of the present Cook County de facto system of classification. A demurrer to the bill having been overruled, the collector elected to stand by it, and a decree was entered granting
the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The collector appealed, and
the supreme court affirmed. Said the court, in part:
The bill also alleged the board of assessors and board of review
...planned to make unequal and un-uniform assessments in Cook
county ....

that knowing the average of assessments of real es-

tate throughout the State was 40 per cent of the full value, the authorities stated publicly that they would assess residence property at
25 per cent of its full value and business property at 60 per cent;
that with the knowledge of average assessments throughout the
State and being charged with the duty of equalizing assessments,
the members of the board of review stated that on certain downtown streets the assessed value was as high as 80 per cent and in
some cases 100 per cent of full value.
.... Under the numerous decisions of this court the property
owner is entitled to a fair and honest exercise of judgment in assessing property. Where intent or design is sought to be shown or is materially involved, consideration may always be given to collateral
facts and circumstances.
....
In the instant case it is apparent that the differences in
value of the various kinds of property could not have been the result
of differences of opinion but were arbitrary and willful on the part
of the taxing authorities. The allegations of the bill, we think,
satisfactorily show that appellee could not have obtained relief
against the arbitrary, willful and apparently fraudulent assessments
made, in any proceeding before the taxing or reviewing bodies
and
43
he necessarily sought a court of equity in which to proceed.
It is a well established rule in Illinois that an intentional violation by the assessing authorities, of the constitutional requirement of uniformity, renders an assessment invalid, and entitles
the taxpayer aggrieved thereby to judicial relief. Thus, in People ex rel. McCallister V. Keokuck and Hamilton Bridge Company,'4 4 the court ruled as follows:
There was a legal objection to the amount of the tax, which the
appellant had a right to prove.... That objection was that the property was arbitrarily, knowingly and fraudulently assessed at its full
market or cash value while all other property was arbitrarily and
knowingly assessed at about forty per cent of such value in accordance with an established rule and long custom for assessing property. Section 1 of article 9 of the constitution requires taxation of
property in proportion to value and authorizes the General Assembly to provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax by
valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her or its property. Such value is to
be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed
in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and any error
in the exercise of honest judgment will not invalidate a tax, but an
arbitrary, known and intentional violation of the rule of uniformity
340 IlM.354, 172 N.E. 772 (1932).
143i. at 358-60, 172 N.E. at 774-75.
1 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 467 (1919).
142
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is an invasion of constitutional right and will not be tolerated. It
is sufficient for an objector to show such willful and intentional
violation of the constitutional provision, and where an assessment
shows a very great disparity and discrimination which could not reasonably4 5have arisen from an error of judgment, the courts will give
relief.
Similarly, in People ex rel. MeDonough v. Schmuhl: 14 6
A tax will not be invalidated because of an error in the exercise
of honest judgment by the assessing bodies, but if the tax is the
result of an arbitrary, intentional violation of the rule of uniformity
the action of the taxing body constitutes1 47an invasion of constitutional right and the tax cannot be upheld.
And in People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail148
road Company:
While it is true that error in the exercise of an honest judgment in fixing the value of property will not invalidate the tax, it is
also true that an arbitrary violation of the rule of uniformity is an
invasion of constitutional right and will not be tolerated.... 149
Also applicable is the proposition that the assessment of
property under circumstances which indicate either a lack of
knowledge of property values on the part of the assessor, or a
deliberate fixing of assessments contrary to such values, will warrant an inference of fraud and the intervention of the courts.
Thus, in People ex rel. McGaughey v. Wilson, 50 the court held as
follows:
It has also been repeatedly held, by this and other courts, that
where the circumstances show the property to have been grossly
over-valued and the assessed valuation is reached under circumstances showing either lack of knowledge of values on the part of
the assessor making the assessment, or a deliberate and knowing fixing of values contrary to the known value, fraud in law, will be
5 1 inferred, and the court will protect the rights2 of the tax-payer.'
And in People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans:
The rule has become firmly established, however, that where the
evidence shows property to have been grossly overvalued, and the
assessed valuation is reached under circumstances showing either
lack of knowledge of known values or a deliberate fixing of values
in law will be inferred and relief
contrary to the known value, fraud
53
will be given to the taxpayer.
It should be noted, moreover, that the basic legal
theory of
the objecting taxpayer would be that his property had been deliberately assessed at a percentage of actual value markedly higher
than that used in the assessment of real property generally. Such
a showing would not only bring him within a long line of cases,
in addition to those cited above, which have declared such an
145 Id. at 249-50, 122 N.E. at 468-69.
146 359 Ill. 446, 194 N.E. 731 (1935).
147 Id. at 449, 194 N.E. at 733.
300 Ill. 399, 133 N.E. 325 (1921).
Id. at 404-05, 133 N.E. at 327.
1501 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5 (1937).
148

149

'I Id. at 497, 12 N.E.2d at 6-7.
15231 Ill.2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543 (1964).
153 Id. at 479, 202 N.E.2d at 544-45.
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overassessment to be constructively fraudulent,154 but it would
also place him safely without the troublesome line of authorities
which have held that the underassessment, or nonassessment, of
other property, or classes of property, affords a taxpayer no
ground for judicial relief. 15
Indeed, the owners of property included in such an overassessed class may well find it easier to establish their prima facie
right to relief, as members of the class, than to prove the exact
quantum of recovery to which they are entitled individually. An
example will serve to illustrate this problem.
On the basis of such data as has been published, it would
appear that at least two major categories of Cook County real
property are heavily overassessed. They are the Department's
group XIV - factories, warehouses, and other industrial buildings; and its group XV - large office buildings, department
store buildings, and like mercantile properties. The prevailing
level of assessment for each group certainly exceeds 75 per cent
of the actual value of the property encompassed by the group,
156
and may well be closer to 100 per cent.
Assume, then, that the prevailing level of assessment for
real property included in group XV is not less than 75 per cent
of its actual value, and that, as indicated above, the prevailing
level of assessment for all Cook County real property is no more
than 50 per cent. The owners of real property encompassed by
group XV - which group includes but a single assessor's class,
No. 91 - can probably contend, successfully, on the basis of the
authorities cited, that the assessments of their properties are so
grossly discriminatory as to be constructively fraudulent. The
aggregate recovery to which such owners would be entitled - under the Hillison, Kohorst and American Refrigerator cases - is
also plain. As a class, they would be entitled to recover the difference between the taxes in fact levied upon their property, and the
taxes which would have been so levied had all real property in
Cook County been assessed at 75 per cent of its actual value. To
approximate, such tax refunds, for the class as a whole, would
154 E.g., People ex rel. McDonough v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 357
Ill. 493, 497-98, 192 N.E. 645, 647 (1934) ; People ex r-el. Tedrick v. Allied
Oil Corp., 388 Ill. 219, 222, 57 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1941).
155 E.g., Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 634, 181 N.E. 417, 421, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 641 (1932); Tuttle v. Bell, 377 Ill. 510, 514-15, 37 N.E.2d
180, 182, cert. denied, 315 U.S. 815 (1941).
156 See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

PROPERTY TAX STATISTICS

-

1965, 134 (1967). The median pre-evaluation sales-assessment ratio for
all Cook County real property is given at 26, that shown for group XIV is
50 and for group XV the figure is 52. As indicated by the Korzen case, it
appears to be generally accepted that the prevailing level of assessment in
Cook County, after equalization, is about 50 per cent, or about twice the
equalization sales-assessment ratio for all real property.

262

The John MarshallJournalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 1:212
157

aggregate about one-third of the taxes originally levied.
The difficulty, however, would be to determine the exact refund which the owner of each specific parcel of real property,
included in such group, would be entitled to receive. In the Railroad Cases, the taxpayers were able to proceed on the theory that
each one of them was assessed at the same percentage of actual
value - 100 per cent. As a result, in any given county the
percentage of recovery was the same for all of the railroads owning property in that county. In the case of non-railroad real
property, there would be no such uniformity, even as to property
included in the same class, or class group.
As to any class or class group, the prevailing level of assessment, determined pursuant to the Department of Revenue's salesassessment ratio studies, is actually a median figure. 58 It assumes, therefore, that some properties probably are assessed at a
percentage of actual value greater than the prevailing level of
assessment, and that other properties are assessed at a percentage of actual value less than that level. And, of course, a taxpayer's recovery would vary greatly, depending upon whether
his property was assessed at a percentage of actual value markedly less or markedly greater than the prevailing level of assessment for the class as a whole. Generally, if a taxpayer's property was assessed at 75 per cent of its actual value, he might
expect a refund of one-third of the original levy; if it were assessed at 60 per cent, a refund of one-sixth; and if it were assessed at 100 per cent, a refund of one-half.
Consequently, in suits challenging assessments under the
present Cook County de facto classification system, there will be
present a variable factor which the taxing authorities sought, unsuccessfully, in Korzen and Musso, to interject into the Railroad
Cases: the respective percentages of actual value at which the
properties of different objecting taxpayers are assessed. Even
though all such properties might have been included in one assessor's class, and even though it might already have been established that the assessments of properties in such class, considered in the aggregate, were constructively fraudulent, each objecting taxpayer would have his own case to prove - based on
17 Assume aggregate assessments of $100,000,000; and aggregate actual value of real property assessed of $200,000,000; and a tax rate of 5 per
cent to yield $5,000,000. Assume also that group XV property has an aggregate actual value of $40,000,000, an aggregate assessed value of $30,000,000
and is subject to an annual tax levy of $1,500,000. If all real property were
to be assessed at 75 per cent, aggregate assessments would increase to
$150,000,000 - with those of group XV remaining at $30,000,000. The tax
rate, to raise $5,000,00, will fall from 5 per cent to 3% per cent; and the
tax levied on group XV property will be $1,000,000 - or a reduction of
one-third from the previous levy of $1,500,000.
158 People ex rel. Korzen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 32 Ill.
2d 554, 561-62, 209 N.E.2d 649, 653 (1965).
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the specific percentage of actual value at which his property had
in fact been assessed - in order to obtain a tax refund.
As a result, litigation challenging the de facto system in
Cook County will be no less complex than the Railroad Cases, and
probably a good deal more intricate. However, it seems safe to
assume, that in view of the vast amounts potentially recoverable,
such litigation will be commenced, and pressed vigorously. It
also appears reasonable to forecast, in view of the implications
of the holdings by the supreme court in the Railroad Cases, that
such litigation will achieve considerable success over the next
several years. And, of course, to the extent that such litigation
is successful, the operation of the de facto system will be circumscribed, and possibly rendered unworkable.
Conversely, it would appear prudent to assume, that in the
near future there will be no spectacular court decision declaring
the entire de facto system to be illegal, and ordering a reassessment of all Cook County real property on an unclassified basis. 59
An End to De Facto Classification -

Certain Consequences

The consequences of a successful attack upon the present de
facto system of classification of real property in Cook County fall
into two main categories: the ultimate results which would allow
the destruction of the system, and the intermediate consequences
of litigation challenging such an important part of the local tax
machinery.
Some of the practical consequences likely to follow from the
destruction of the present system are clearly discernible, at least
in their broad outlines, on the basis of available statistical information. 10 Assuming that the prevailing level of assessment,
in Cook County, for all real property is about 50 per cent, the
published data indicates that if de facto classification were to be
ended, and each parcel of real property assessed at approximately
the same percentage of its actual value, the increase in assessment, and tax, for the average owner of a single family house
would be about one-third161 and that for many home owners the
6 2
increase could be far greater.'
159

See Carey and Schulyer, The Illinois Taxpayer's "Day in Court,"

31 ILL. L. REv. 993, 1007 (1937).
180 With regard to Cook County real property taxes for the year 1961,

the average assessment ratio for single family houses was 37.7 per cent,
the median assessment ratio for such houses was 37.2 per cent, and the
coefficient of dispersion factor was 26.1 per cent. II CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 1962, 142, table 22.
161See note 160 supra. 50.0% - 37.7% = 12.3%; 12.3%/37.7%
=

32.6%.

162 One way to illustrate the practical results which might be expected to
follow from abolition of the existing de facto classification systems, is to
take, as an example, nine single family houses, and to assume that their re-

spective assessment ratios are such that the median assessment ratio is 37.2

264

The John MarshallJournalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 1:212

There is also this additional consideration: the adverse impact upon the financial position of local governments in Cook
County, of extensive litigation challenging the present system.
The Railroad Cases established that the preferred method to
employ, in attacking an existing assessment system, is for the
taxpayer to pay, "under protest," that portion of the tax levy
which he considers to be excessive, and then to follow the procedure prescribed in the case of taxes so paid.163 Upon the application of the county collector for judgment for the "delinquent"
taxes paid under protest, the taxpayer, by objections filed with
the court, would raise, and litigate, his contention that the assessment of his property was so grossly discriminatory as to be
constructively fraudulent.1 6 4

From the vantage point of local

governments, the taxes so paid "under protest" would be "frozen," and therefore unavailable until the conclusion of the litigation in which the taxpayer contested the validity of the assessment.1 15
As increasingly large numbers of taxpayers came to realize
that the present classification system is subject to successful legal attack, they would, of course, protect their interests by paying a substantial portion of their real estate taxes "under protest." Given that the prevailing level of assessment in Cook
per cent, and the coefficient of dispersion factor is 26.1 per cent. See II
CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 1962, 13, 142.
House
Ratio of Assessment
Deviation
A
23.7%
- 13.5
B
24.0%
- 13.2
C
26.0%
- 11.2
D
32.0%
5.2
E
37.2% (median)
0.0
F
43.0%
+ 5.8
G
47.0%
+ 9.8
H
50.0%
+ 12.8
I
53.0%
+ 15.8
Total of Deviations
87.3
Average Deviation (87.3/9)
9.7
Coefficient of Dispersion (9.7/37.2)
0.261or26.1%
Assume now that it becomes necessary to assess each of these nine houses
at 50.0 per cent of its actual value. The results, per house, would be as
follows:
Old Ratio
New Ratio
Increase
House
of Assessment
of Assessment
or Decrease
A
23.7%
50.0%
+ 110.9%
B
24.0%
50.0%
+ 108.2%
C
26.0%
50.0%
+ 92.3%
D
32.0%
50.0%
+ 56.3%
E
37.2%
50.0%
+ 34.4%
F
43.0%
50.0%
+ 16.3%
G
47.0%
50.0%
+
6.4%
H
50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
I
53.0%
50.0%
5.6%
163 People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 22 Ill.
2d 88, 91-96, 174 N.E.2d 175, 176-78 (1961) ; People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R.R., 22 Ill.2d 104, 106-09, 174 N.E.2d 182, 184-85 (1961).
104 Young, Taxpayers' Remedies, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 248, 274-77.
165 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 120, §§675, 679, 781 (1965).
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County is about 50 per cent of the actual value of real property
generally, and that the prevailing level of assessment for commercial and industrial property is about 75 per cent of actual
value, the owners of commercial and industrial property, as a
group, would have good reason to pay about one-third of their
taxes "under protest." If all owners of such property were to
follow this procedure, about eleven per cent of real estate taxes
in Cook County, and about thirteen per cent of all real estate
taxes in Chicago, would be so paid.166
As previously noted, litigation challenging the present classification system will be a prolonged and difficult matter, extending over a period of several years.,' 7 The cumulative effect of
such "freezing" of tax revenues could easily produce a series of
financial crises for local governments. 168
The Future of De Facto Classification-

A Possible Solution

Considerable differences of opinion exist, and have long
existed, as to whether real property should or should not be
classified for purposes of taxation. 1 9 There probably will never
be agreement on an answer to this question.1 70 However, Cook
County is now faced, not with a theoretical tax dilemma, but
with a very serious practical problem.
The present de facto classification system has been in effect
for several decades. Huge sums have been invested, over the
years, in conscious or unconscious reliance upon it. To abolish
it now would work a tremendous hardship for a great many taxpayers, and would also, for a period of years, seriously disrupt
the finances of local government. Accordingly, in the early 1960's,
as the Railroad Cases began to cast a pall over the continued prospects of the de facto system, considerable attention was given to
the possibility of "legalizing" the present system. Such legitimatization of the existing arrangement would entail, of course,
an amendment to the Revenue Article of the state constitution.
Thus, the question of classification of real property in Cook
166 For the year 1961, commercial and industrial real property coinprised about 33 per cent of the total of appraised real property for Cook
County as a whole, and for the City of Chicago alone, about 40 per cent.
See II CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 1962, 142, table 22. 33.0%/3 = 11.0%;
40.0%/3 = 13.3%.
167 In the matter of the Railroad Cases, the "test case" for Cook County
involved the objections of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. to taxes
paid by it, "under protest," for the year 1957. This litigation was not concluded until July, 1965.
16S In the matter of the Railroad Cases, the "test case" for Cook County,
that of the Burlington Route for the year 1957, involved the relatively
slight sum of $324,989. By the time this litigation was concluded, the case
was part of a series of refund claims expected to aggregate some $40,000,000.
See Chicago Daily News, July 23, 1965 at 28 col. 4.
169 See Cushman, The Proposed Revision of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, 1952 U. ILL. L. F. 226, 240-41.
170 See Chicago Sun-Times, March 21, 1965, at 56, col. 1.
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County played an important part in the negotiations which took
place from 1961 to 1965 regarding revision of that Article.
These negotiations produced general agreement on at least
one basic proposition: that the status quo should be maintained
with respect to the taxation of real property. The problem was
how to achieve this overall objective, in view of the sharp differentiation which had come to exist, as to such taxation, between
Cook County and the other counties of the state. To the extent
there is de facto classification of real estate in the downstate
counties, it differs greatly from that in effect in Cook County.
The Cook County system favors residential property at the expense of commercial and industrial property, while in the down71
state counties, the opposite is generally the rule.
The solution finally reached was the following complex compromise, embodied in a proposed revision of the Revenue Ar72
ticle.
1. In the 101 downstate counties, all real estate was to constitute one class. This meant that there was to be no
classification of real property, for purposes of taxation,
in those counties; and any existing classification was to
be abolished.
2. For Cook County, a modified "Grandfather Clause" was
devised to preserve the status quo. The de facto classification system, as it existed on January 1, 1965, was to
be continued, subject to these possible modifications:
a. The county assessor would have been empowered to
change the various levels of assessment, provided
that the "spread" between the percentage of actual
value used in the assessment of the lowest taxed
class, and the percentage used in assessing any other
class, was no greater than that existing on January
1, 1965. As a practical matter, this meant that the
assessor would have been able to decrease, but not
to increase, the percentages of actual value used in
the assessment of the more highly taxed classes of
real property. Consequently, he could decrease, but
not increase the class discriminations which now
exist.
b. Somewhat similarly, the county assessor was to have
been empowered to abolish classes of real lroperty,
and to create new ones, provided that no real property might have been assessed, by reason of any
such change, at a higher percentage of actual value
17'See Fisher, An Economist's Appraisal of the Illinois Tax System, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 543, 580-81.
172H. fJ. Res. 71, II ILL. L. 3780-83 (1965).
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than that at which it would have been assessed had
no such change been made.
A cumbersome procedure, never intended to be operative,
was also established for abolishing the classification of
real property in Cook County.
Thus, classification under the present de facto system, subject only to the possibility of minor administrative modification of that system in the future, was to be
made permanent. Provision was also made to protect
the position of the railroads, as established in the Railroad Cases.
Finally, it was provided that any person, aggrieved
by any of the provisions respecting the taxation of real
property in Cook County, "would be entitled to appropriate relief at law or equity.173
The above provisions regarding the assessment and taxation
of Cook County real property comprised section 13 of the proposed Revenue Article submitted, as a proposition, to the voters
of the state at the general election held on November 8, 1966.
The proposed Article failed of adoption; it received a majority
of the votes cast on the proposition, but not the two-thirds ma74
jority required.
No new proposal to amend the Revenue Article may be
submitted to the voters prior to the general election of November,
1970, and any proposition, to be considered at that election, would
5
have to be approved by the general assembly at its 1969 session.
The general assembly did initiate, at its 1967 session, the calling
of a constitutional convention. The question whether to hold a
convention will be submitted to the voters at the 1968 election.
If the voters approve, a constitutional convention would be
elected, and convened, late in 1969, or early in 1970.176
Revision of the Revenue Article will be an important issue
to be resolved by such a constitutional convention, if one be called,
or if not, by the 1969 regular session of the general assembly. In
either event, a crucial aspect of the problem will be the provisions
regarding the assessment and taxation of real property in Cook
County.
The real property provisions of the 1966 Revenue Article
'17

The purpose of this provision was to avoid, as to section 13 of

the proposed Revenue Article, the restrictions on judicial review contained in section 1 of the present article.
174 STATE

OF ILLINOIS OFFICIAL VOTE

1966, 22-24 (compiled by Paul

Powell, Secretary of State). The vote on the proposed Revenue Article was

1,642,542 "yes," and 1,434,330 "no." The total number of ballots cast at
the election was 3,928,428. The "yes" vote fell 408,704 short of a two-thirds
majority of those voting on the proposition, and 321,691 short of an absolute
majority of those voting at the election.
175 ILL. CONST. art. XIV, §2.
176Id. §1.
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proposal were sharply criticized. Nonetheless, their essential
features are likely to form a part of any revised article. Most
of the objections centered on the marked differentiation which
the proposed Article would have made, as between Cook County
and the remainder of the state: for Cook County, a complex
"Grandfather Clause" preserving the de facto classification as
it existed on January 1, 1965; for the rest of the state, a simple
provision that there should be no classification of real property
for purposes of taxation. The objections raised both policy considerations and questions of federal constitutional law; a number of technical, legal objections were also directed at the form
of the provisions in section 13.
The objections upon policy grounds may be briefly summarized. It was contended that if classification of real property
were beneficial, it should be permitted everywhere in the state,
not just in Cook County; and if not beneficial, then it should not
be allowed anywhere, not even in Cook County.
The governing consideration with the general assembly,
however, and a consideration likely still to be operative, was that
there was no appreciable desire, anywhere in Illinois, for a
change in the applicable system governing the taxation of real
property nor was it feasible politically to make any such change.
The real estate provisions of the proposed Article, in differentiating between Cook County and the rest of the state, did not constitute an innovation, although such was the initial impression
conveyed. In fact, the proposed Article would have done no more
than recognize, and legitimatize, the differences and distinctions
which were existent, and entrenched.
The "constitutional" objections to the proposed Article, simply stated, were that the division of the state into two parts, in
one of which the classification of real property for purposes of
taxation would be allowed, and, in the other part forbidden, would
violate the "equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the
fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution.
It should be noted at the outset that the taxes which would
have been imposed upon real property, pursuant to the proposed
Article, would have been local property taxes for the support of
counties, cities, school districts, and the like. No state property
tax has been levied for over thirty years; and the proposed Article, unlike the present one, contained no specific provision for
one.1 7 7 The basic question, therefore, applicable to all but a few
taxing districts in the state, was whether a state constitution
might lawfully provide for classification in one taxing district
but not in others, it being assumed that within each taxing dis177 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1; H. J. Res. 71, II ILL. L. 3780-83 (1965);
see Cohn, Constitutional Limitations on Income Taxation in Illinois, 1961
U. ILL. L. F. 586, 598.
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trict the rule would be uniform; either there would be, or there
would not be, classification of property in that district.
To this constitutional question, no definitive answer could
be given, there being a marked dearth of authority. In support
of the 1966 proposals, however, two somewhat unrelated arguments were advanced. One was the marked latitude which has
been extended by the Supreme Court of the United States, in
recent decades, to the states in matters of taxation. 1 8 The other
was the practical consideration that if these proposals violate
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, it
would appear a fortiori that existing practices under the present
Article do likewise. In brief, there exists a problem of federal
constitutional law which must be faced, and resolved in any event.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Constitution requires the uniform assessment
and taxation of all real property. Cook County officials, notably
the county assessor and the board of appeals, have ignored this
requirement for many years. They have initiated and maintained, instead, a de facto -classification system under which different types, or classes of real property are assessed at widely
varying percentages of their actual value. This system has
operated to favor owner-occupied residential property at the expense of commercial and industrial real estate. The de facto
classification system depends, for its continued existence, upon
the inability of those aggrieved by its operation to obtain effective judicial relief. The so-called Railroad Cases indicate that
such relief will now be forthcoming, although only through complex and prolonged litigation. The destruction of the de facto
system, and the litigation necessary to accomplish that result,
would have very drastic and disruptive consequences for Cook
County taxpayers and for Cook County governments.
The de facto system can be preserved, and the consequences
of such litigation avoided, if the system is legalized - that is to
say, if the present de facto system is made a de jure one. However, such legitimatization of the present system will require
revision of the Revenue Article of the Illinois Constitution. Such
revision of the Revenue Article will be difficult. It will be necessary to reconcile long standing differences between Cook County
and the remainder of the state, with regard to the assessment and
taxation of real property. The most promising approach would
be an Article which coupled a provision forbidding the classification of real property in the downstate counties, with a "Grandfather Clause" preserving the present Cook County de facto
system of classification as it existed on a certain date.
i78E.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R. v. Browning, 310 U.S.
362, 368-69 (1940).

